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Abstract
The present thesis examines one of the non–standard preferences, the theory
of disappointment aversion (DA) from Gul (1991), within an asset allocation
problem. Related to the area of decision–making under risk, it sheds light on: (i)
at the global level, how the risk exposure reduces quantitatively in the presence
of disappointment aversion; (ii) given the empirical data, what are the plausible
levels of disappointment aversion around different financial markets; and (iii)
how disappointment aversion interacts with both inherent risk attitudes (i.e., risk
aversion, subjective probability weighting and cultural dimensions) and
environmental stimuli (i.e., pleasant or unpleasant odours).
In Chapter 2, drawing upon the seminal study of Ang et al. (2005), we
incorporate disappointment aversion (that is, extra aversion to outcomes that are
worse than prior expectations) within a simple theoretical portfolio choice
model. Based on the results of this model, we then empirically address the
portfolio allocation problem of an investor who chooses between a risky and a
risk–free asset using international data from 19 countries. Our findings strongly
support the view that disappointment aversion leads investors to reduce their
exposure to the stock market (i.e., disappointment aversion significantly
depresses the portfolio weights on equities in all cases considered). Overall, our
study shows that, in addition to risk aversion, disappointment aversion plays an
important role in explaining the equity premium puzzle around the world.
In Chapter 3, we investigate investors’ asset allocation when their utility
consists of wealth utility and disappointment aversion utility in which gains and
losses are calculated with respect to the expected wealth. We show that optimal
investment proportions increase when disappointment aversion on the assets
decreases, and that disappointment aversion increases when expected excess
returns increase. When decreasing absolute risk aversion holds, disappointment
aversion increase with wealth, which is supported by our empirical results with
asset allocations in pension funds of 35 OECD countries. We also find that
individualism is positively related to disappointment aversion. These results
indicate that the overconfidence represented by their individualism leads to more
disappointment when losses occur.
Chapter 4 aims to investigate the role of odours on DA in a monetary gamble
task. We elicited the degree of DA based on an experimental procedure similar
to Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009, 2013). Our study shows for the first time that
unpleasant odours increase DA in a monetary gamble task. Such odour–related
variations in individual DA were associated with hedonic evaluations of odours
but not with odour intensity. Increased disappointment aversion while perceiving
an unpleasant odour suggests a dynamic adjustment of aversion to losses. Given
that odours are biological signals of hazards, such adjustment of disappointment
aversion may have adaptive value in situations entailing threat or danger.
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis and points out further directions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

CHAPTER 1 3
1.1 General Introduction
The traditional finance paradigm relies heavily on an assumption of “fully
rational agents”. In the field of finance, the concept “rational” typically means
two things: (i) people evaluate risk and make decisions based on the expected
utility of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), where their preferences are
complete, continuing, transferable and independent across states; (ii) new
information will be updated into their beliefs in the manner of Bayes’ rules. Such
settings make the traditional framework appealingly predictable because agents
always make consistent choices to maximize their expected utility. However,
recent facts about the cross section of average returns (i.e., equity premium
puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Mehra, 2008)) and inconsistencies of
observed choice data (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Tversky and Kahneman,
1974) have promoted a rethink of investors’ behaviour in terms of
decision–making under risk. After years of effort, there has been an explosion of
progress on so–called non–expected utility theories (Loomes and Sugden, 1982;
Bell, 1985; Gul, 1991; Segal, 1987, 1989; Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974) which makes it even clearer that people violate the
assumption of expected utility theory when assessing risk.
During the early 1980s, behavioural finance eventually emerged, at least in
part, in response to the financial anomalies that cannot be fully understood by
traditional frameworks. Generally speaking, it argues that investors are not fully
rational agents. Specifically, it investigates whether better explanations can be
achieved by using a non–standard preference (i.e., situations where people do
not evaluate risk according to the expected utility) and non–standard beliefs (i.e.,
situations where people’s beliefs are subject to psychological biases and deviate
from Bayes’ law).
This study focuses on the implications of non–standard preferences from a
behavioural perspective. In particular, it aims to rationalize the equity premium
puzzle by considering behavioural components in the risk attitude, such as Gul’s
disappointment aversion theory, a version derived from a similar idea, loss
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aversion in prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992). Moreover, a
novel framework has been developed to estimate aggregate disappointment
aversion quantitatively around different financial markets. We then analytically
show how the disappointment aversion is related to other factors such as risk
aversion and cultural variations. In addition to economic attributes, an
experimental procedure is conducted to explore whether disappointment
preferences are affected by external stimuli (i.e., pleasant & unpleasant odours).
We use a few subsections below to briefly discuss the key concepts in this study.
1.1.1 The Equity Premium Puzzle
It stands to reason that equities should earn higher returns than risk–free
assets in the long run. However, how can we know the historical equity
premiums are at a reasonable level? Using Lucas’s (1978) standard general
equilibrium model, Mehra and Prescott (1985) firstly document how the
required equity premium in the American market is only about 0.35%, which is
inconsistent with the observed premium of 6.18%. Similar statistical differentials
are documented for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, the
Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, and the UK (Dimson et al., 2008; Mehra,
2007). Table 1.1 lists the equity premiums for these countries.
[Insert TABLE 1.1 about here]
The equity premium puzzle arises as solely relying on risk aversion fails to
explain the huge magnitude of equity premium. In order to necessarily match the
observed equity premiums, risk aversion should reconcile itself to a value from
30 to 40, which Mehra and Prescott conclude is too high to be plausible. To put
it another way, even though stocks are more attractive than relatively risk–free
assets, investors appear to be so unwilling to hold stocks that they demand a
substantial risk premium in order to hold the market supply.
According to the work of Mehra (2008), which is an excellent survey that
organises the most effective solutions related to this puzzle, ongoing research
and expansions of databases have promoted possible solutions in two broad
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categories. Either the existing data misdirected the problem to statistical illusions
(empirical side) or else current models were short of responses to potential
factors (theoretical side). On the empirical side, the existence of the puzzle has
been questioned by several researchers who interpret the “abnormal” stock
returns as a statistical illusion driven by common biases (e.g., survivorship,
success and selection bias) or the use of non–stationary data (Fama and French,
2002; Dimson and Staunton, 2006). On the theoretical side, various risk–related
explanations that have been proposed to stress the inability of the standard risk
paradigm are: the risk–free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989); non–time separable utility
(Epstein and Zin, 1991); economic catastrophe concerns (Barro, 2006);
idiosyncratic and uninsurable income risk (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996);
and habit formation (Constantinides, 1990; Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane,
1999; Campbell, 2001).
1.1.2 The Preference of Loss Aversion and Probability Weighting
Instead of being “fully rational” during the decision–making process, a
common question is: what is the best plausible alternative to describe how
people think about risk? A famous answer from the behavioural perspective is
the prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1992). Fundamental to
prospect theory is the preference of loss aversion, which suggests that (i)
decisions are made according to the potential losses and gains rather than final
wealth; (ii) agents evaluate potential outcomes based on a reference point; and
(iii) the utility is steeper in losses than gains of the same magnitude. Formally, a
value function with loss aversion can be shown in the following form:
U(x) =
 x
v+ , x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)v− , x < 0,
where λ is the coefficient that controls the degree of loss aversion, v+ and v−
are the curvature parameters. The function is believed to be concave for gains and
convex for losses as the median values of v+ and v− are reported by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) as both being 0.88 while the median λ is 2.25.
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Among many subsequent studies, the idea of loss aversion has been
particularly successful in explaining the equity premium puzzle (i.e., Benartzi
and Thaler, 1995; Barberis et al., 2001; Hwang and Satchell, 2010). The simple
logic is that: as people are loss–averse, if stock market goes up in the next year,
they will feel good; on the other hand, if the stock returns lead to losses in the
next year, they will feel very bad. As a result of this kind of thinking, in addition
to risk aversion, investors tend to consider stocks less favourably and require an
extra premium in order to keep their holdings.
The concept of probability weighting is proposed in dealing with choice
inconsistencies documented in subsequent research of prospect theory. As relying
on only the objective probability weighting function is not sufficient to match the
complexity of behavioural patterns observed in experimental investigations,
people tend to overweight unlikely extreme outcomes. Quiggin (1982)
introduces a rank–dependent utility model where weights depend on the true
probability of an outcome as well as its ranking relative to other outcomes. The
combination of rank and reference point dependent utility gives birth to a later
version of prospect theory, the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). CPT utilizes a transformed probability weighting function to
account for the redistribution of decision weights that overweight small
probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities. In particular, it is
defined for gains and losses separately:
w+(p) =
pγ
+(
pγ+ + (1− p)γ+) 1γ+ , w−(p) = p
γ−(
pγ− + (1− p)γ−) 1γ− ,
where p is the cumulative probability of any possible outcome. With one extra
curvature parameter γ (0 < γ < 1, γ+ for gains and γ− for losses), the weighting
function allocates more (less) weight to unlikely (likely) events. In other words,
tails of any distribution are over–emphasized while those outcomes around its
peak are less valued.
Besides the weighting function in CPT, plenty of alternatives have been
developed in the literature. For example, Prelec (1998) provides a
single–parameter version of the weighting function, where the curvature
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parameter is identical for both the domains of losses and gains. This simplifies
the function to:
w(p) = exp[−(ln(p))γ ].
According to the experimental work of Gonzalez and Wu (1999), despite its
simplicity, the use of symmetric curvature fits the median data as well as the other
separate–curvature models. Therefore, for the numerical investigations in Chapter
3, we use Prelec’s weighting functions as our primary setting. For a demonstration
here; suppose a stock has normally distributed annual returns with µr = 10%,
standard deviation=0.1865, and let δ = 0.741. Figure 1.1 compares the CPT and
Prelec’s weighting functions to its original density function.
[Insert FIGURE 1.1 about here]
A glance at Figure 1.1 shows important attributes of the weighting function.
Firstly, decision weights are underweighted for the region of more frequent
events. As now small gains become less attractive, investors are less motivated to
take further risks. On the contrary, fewer decision weights on tiny losses ease the
panic of suffering. Investors therefore have a higher tendency to play with risks.
Secondly, decision weights are exaggerated at the edges of the distribution.
Investors become risk–seeking if they recognize a massive gain possibility, even if
the chance of occurrence is small. On the other hand, additional concerns about
those very unlikely huge losses make investors extremely safety–oriented, as
now, in their view, a disaster–like outcome occupies more decision weight than it
should do. Lastly, the modified density functions are highly non–linear, resulting
in more severe sensitivity near p = 1, and p = 0.
1.1.3 Gul’s Theory of Disappointment Aversion
The term “disappointment” was first used by Bell (1985) within the context of
binary lotteries. According to Bell, disappointment is a psychological reaction to
an outcome that fails to satisfy expectations held by the decision–maker. Consider
1Analogous to the estimation of Gonzalez and Wu (1999), in the rest of this study, δ = 0.74 is
adopted universally.
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a lottery (x, p, y), which has a probability p of winning x and a probability (1− p)
of yielding y, (x > y). The decision–maker’s expectation depends on the expected
pay–off of this lottery: c = px+ (1− p)y.
The decision–maker will be disappointed if y occurs, which means he/she
receives less than expected; the measure of such disappointment is:
d(c− y) = d(px+ (1− p)y − y) = dp(x− y).
On the contrary, the outcome will be regarded as “elation” if x is received:
e(x− c) = e(x− px− (1− p)y) = e(1− p)(x− y),
where d (e) (d ≥ 0, e ≥ 0) controls the proportional disappointment (elation)
between the realised outcomes and expectations. The net psychological
satisfaction that comes with the lottery can be expressed as:
p(e(x− c))− (1− p)(d(c− y)) = (e− d)p(1− p)(x− y).
Finally, the overall utility function is based on the expected economic pay–off
(consumption) and her/his psychological satisfaction:
U(·) = [px− (1− p)y] + (e− d)p(1− p)(x− y).
Although Bell’s model has intuitive appeal, it is restricted to binary lotteries
only. Following his idea, Gul (1991) proposed the theory of disappointment
aversion (DA) that is more general in describing decision–making under risk. At
the core of Gul’s framework, potential outcomes are further divided into elation
and disappointment based on an endogenous reference point. People are
supposed to be disappointment–averse: they are more sensitive to
disappointment than elation of the same magnitude. Consider the following
piecewise utility as a compact way to show the functional form of
disappointment aversion:
U(x) =

(
xt+h − Etxt+h
)
, xt+h ≥ Etxt+h
A
(
xt+h − Etxt+h
)
, xt+h < Etxt+h
.
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Let h be the investment horizon while Etxt+h refers to the applicable reference
point that all outcomes during t+ h will be compared with. The level of Etxt+h is
determined by the certainty equivalent (the certain level of wealth that generates
the same utility according to an investor’s choices). Such a prospect–dependent
feature means the reference point does not necessarily have to be positive when
the market outlook turns stagnant. Additionally, Routledge and Zin (2010) allow
the reference point to lie below the certainty equivalent. However, we maintain
the scope of this study within the case where the reference point is equal to the
certainty equivalent. With only one parameter richer than the expected utility, A
(A > 1) is the coefficient that controls the degree of disappointment aversion.
The preference of disappointment aversion is a derivative preference of loss
aversion, as they both share many basic advantages compared with the expected
utility such as: i) reference dependence; ii) diminishing sensitivity; iii) steeper
value function of negative utility; and iv) probability weighting. However, the
main difference stems from the way in which the reference point is determined
in each case. In the case of loss aversion, a pre–set exogenous reference point is
frequently applied, e.g., the status quo (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992)
and the risk–free rate (see Barberis and Huang, 2001; Barberis et al., 2001). In
the case of disappointment aversion, the reference point is endogenously
updated according to upcoming events. The choice of an exogenous or
endogenous reference point is particularly relevant in applications of long–term
investment horizons. For example, after examining US returns over the sample
period 1926–1990, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) were forced to conclude that
investors are myopic (they have a one–year investment horizon) in loss aversion.
Otherwise, the levels of loss aversion would be too high to be plausible. Similar
results can also be found in a longer sampling period of the US market, where
Fielding and Stracca (2007) demonstrate that, under a fixed reference point, the
loss aversion parameter is inflated to 25 at the 10–year horizon. In contrast, due
to an endogenously updated reference point, the degree of disappointment
averison only mildly increases to about 2.5.
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1.2 Contributions and Structure
In the literature, the preference of disappointment aversion only appears in
equilibrium models over consumption (Epstein and Zin, 1990, 2001). Within this
thesis, we embed disappointment aversion into a typical asset allocation problem.
In broad terms, we argue that the portfolio choices between risky assets and risk–
free assets are jointly determined by risk aversion and disappointment aversion. In
Chapter 2, by extending the seminal study of Ang et al. (2005) to the global scale,
we have demonstrated to what extent the equity weights will drop in response
to the presence of disappointment aversion among 19 different markets. With a
sufficient level of disappointment aversion, investors may not even participate in
the equity market.
In Chapter 3, we develop a formal treatment to measure aggregate levels of
disappointment aversion in financial markets. In addition, based on predictions
of the model, a cross–sectional investigation is conducted to explore potential
determinants of disappointment aversion across a number of countries and
regions. Chapter 3 reinforces the theoretical base of current literature in the
following aspects. First, our approach not only allows investors to be
disappointment–averse, but also accommodates expected utility as a special case.
This setting grants us a stronger compatibility between our framework and the
standard preferences. Second, our framework fully allows the advantage of a
standard risk–value model (e.g., Jia and Dyer, 1996) to enhance the
measurement of risk aversion. Third, due to the desire of tractability, previous
behaviour portfolio models are often limited to a typical risky & risk–free
portfolio (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Ang et al., 2005; Fielding and Stracca,
2007; Hwang and Satchell, 2010). Our approach allows separate assessments of
multiple asset classes without upper limits. Fourth, the sensation derived from
elation or avoided disappointment does significantly affect our utility – but so
does the absolute pleasure of consumption we purchase with the wealth.
Therefore, in contrast to prior formulations based on the value function defined
solely based on gains and losses under risk, our approach makes explicit the way
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preferences also depend on absolute consumption levels. In line with Koszegi and
Rabin (2007), we define the basic form of utility in Chapter 3, where the overall
utility has two components: U(c|r) = m(c) + n(c|r), m(c) is a “consumption
utility” typically stressed in economics and n(c|r) is an “elation–disappointment
utility” generated from risk–taking activities in terms of a reference point r.
From the empirical side, results in Chapter 3 argue that cultural differences
can play an important role during the decision–making process under risk, which
is consistent with the view that investors from different backgrounds frame their
risk attitude in different ways and are subject to psychological biases (e.g., Chui
et al., 2010; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Frijns et al., 2013; Breuer et al.,
2014). The cultural variation of DA challenges the traditional risk–based theories
and contributes a new dimension to current behavioural literature. Additionally,
consistent results are also found to support the assertion that investors tend to
apply different rules to decide their holdings instead of assessing them as a
portfolio. This tendency is classified as narrow framing, which is another popular
idea among the behavioural studies (e.g., Berkelaar et al., 2004; Gomes, 2005;
Barberis et al., 2006; Barberis and Huang, 2009).
Chapter 4 aims to investigate the impact of environmental stimuli (pleasant &
unpleasant odours) on DA in a monetary gamble task. We elicited the level of DA
based on an experimental procedure similar to Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009,
2013). Our study shows for the first time that unpleasant odours increase DA in a
monetary gamble task. Odour–related individual variations in DA were
associated with hedonic evaluations of odours but not with odour intensity.
Increased disappointment aversion while perceiving an unpleasant odour
suggests a dynamic adjustment of aversion towards greater sensitivity to losses.
Given that odours are biological signals of hazards, such adjustment of
disappointment aversion may have adaptive value in situations entailing threat
or danger.
Chapter 5 provides the general conclusion and further directions of this study,
which includes some realistic but also more complicated extensions, such as the
general disappointment aversion (Routledge and Zin, 2010) which adopts a
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“fuzzy” reference point (outcomes become disappointment only if they fall
sufficiently far below the certainty equivalent) and the dynamic portfolio choices
over disappointment aversion (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2009; De Giorgi and
Legg, 2012). In particular, a more detailed discussion will be provided regarding
the use of multiple reference points (Koop and Johnson, 2012).
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1.3 Tables & Figures of This Chapter
Table 1.1
Equity Premium in Selected Countries
This table presents real mean returns in selected countries. All data except India
are sourced from the Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2012 distributed by
Morningstar; data in India’s refer to Mehra (2007).
Country Period Market Index Risk–Free Security Equity Premium
Australia 1900–2011 7.20% 0.70% 6.50%
Canada 1900–2011 5.70% 1.60% 4.10%
France 1900–2011 2.90% -2.80% 5.70%
Germany 1900–2011 2.90% -2.40% 5.30%
India 1991–2004 12.60% 1.30% 11.30%
Japan 1900–2011 3.60% -1.90% 5.50%
Netherlands 1900–2011 4.80% 0.70% 4.10%
South Africa 1900–2011 7.20% 1.00% 6.20%
Sweden 1900–2011 6.10% 1.80% 4.30%
UK 1900–2011 5.20% 1.00% 4.20%
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Figure 1.1
Probability Weighting Function vs. Original Density Function
This figure compares the KT’s (Kahneman and Tversky) and Prelec’s weighting
functions to its original density function. The stock returns are supposed to follow
a normal distribution with moments: µr = 10%, standarddeviation = 0.1865, and
the curvature parameter is set to δ = 0.74
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Chapter 2
Disappointment Aversion and the
Equity Premium Puzzle: New
International Evidence
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2.1 Introduction
A number of studies have shown that stocks outperform bonds over long
horizons by a surprisingly large margin. For example, Mehra and Prescott (1985)
report that the annual real return on the US stock market has exceeded that of
bonds by about 6.36% over the last 116 years. This empirical regularity,
commonly referred to as the “equity premium puzzle”, is not unique to the US
market but is also observed in other international markets. Dimson and Staunton
(2006) and Mehra (2007) report a significant equity premium for several
developed (e.g., UK–6.1%; Australia–8.5%; Germany–9.1%; Japan–9.8%) and
developing markets (e.g., India–11.3%).
A large volume of empirical and theoretical research focuses on the origin
and the drivers of the equity premium puzzle2. On the empirical side, the
existence of a puzzle has been questioned by several researchers who interpret
the “abnormal” stock returns as a statistical illusion driven by common biases
(e.g., survivorship, success and selection bias) or the use of non–stationary data
(Fama and French, 2002; Dimson and Staunton, 2006). On the theoretical side,
various risk–related explanations have been proposed to stress the inadequacy of
the standard risk paradigm: the risk–free rate puzzle (Weil, 1989);
non–time–separable utility (Epstein and Zin, 1991); economic catastrophe
concerns (Barro, 2006); idiosyncratic and uninsurable income risk
(Constantinides and Duffie, 1996); and habit formation (Constantinides, 1990;
Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Campbell, 2001).
Behavioural finance has emerged in response to the failure of traditional
models to fully explain investment behaviour. Its key assumption is that investors
do not always make rational decisions (see Barberis and Thaler, 2003).
Following a series of influential papers by Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1979,
1992), a growing body of literature focuses on behavioural explanations of the
equity premium puzzle. Fundamental to the prospect theory of Tversky and
Kahneman (1979) is the concept of loss aversion, which refers to the tendency to
2DeLong and Magin (2009) and Mehra (2008) provide reviews on the equity premium puzzle
and the various explanations that have been proposed in the literature.
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prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains. A similar, though not identical,
concept of loss aversion is that of disappointment aversion. Gul (1991) develops
an axiomatic disappointment aversion framework where agents form an
endogenous expected certainty equivalent. Outcomes below that equivalent are
treated as “disappointment”. Since the reference point of disappointment
aversion could possibly be higher than the status quo, even positive outcomes
that lie below the reference point may still disappoint investors. Preferences that
express disappointment aversion and loss aversion share the following three
features: i) reference dependence; ii) diminishing sensitivity; and iii) a steeper
value function of negative utility. The main difference stems from the way in
which the reference point is determined in each case. In the case of loss aversion,
a pre–set exogenous reference point is frequently applied, e.g., the status quo
(see Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992), and the risk–free rate (see Barberis
and Huang, 2001; Barberis et al., 2001). In the case of disappointment aversion,
the reference point is endogenously determined according to investors’ former
expectations (see Gul, 1991). Such a prospect–dependent feature is known as
the certainty equivalent3.
This study adopts a “behavioural” perspective and attempts to provide further
insights into the drivers of the equity premium puzzle. In particular, drawing
upon the portfolio choice model of Ang et al. (2005), we incorporate
disappointment aversion within a simple theoretical asset allocation model.
Based on the results of this model, we then empirically address the portfolio
allocation problem of an investor who chooses between a risky and a risk–free
asset. An important contribution is the international nature of our study. While
Ang et al. (2005) focus exclusively on the US market over the period 1926–1998,
our analysis is based on the Dimson–Marsh–Staunton (DMS) database
distributed by Morningstar4, which contains data spanning 112 years of history
3The choice of an exogenous or endogenous reference point is particularly relevant in
applications that consider long investment horizons. For example (Fielding and Stracca, 2007),
show that, under a fixed reference point, the loss aversion parameter is inflated to 25 at the 10–year
horizon. In contrast, under a reference point that is endogenously determined, the disappointment
aversion parameter only mildly increases to 2.5.
4Dimson et al. (2008) demonstrate that equity premiums around the world can be overstated due
to a series of ex–post selection biases. Common forms of such biases include survivorship, success,
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across 19 countries and is free of ex–post selection bias. This is important
because the magnitude of the equity premium differs significantly across markets
(see Dimson and Staunton, 2006; Mehra, 2008). Extending the study of the
equity premium puzzle to the global market helps to understand whether such
differences can be attributed to behavioural or non–risk–based explanations
(e.g., differences in borrowing constraints, transaction costs, etc.). To our
knowledge, this is the first paper to examine whether disappointment aversion
plays a role in explaining the international equity premium puzzle.
Our findings strongly confirm the view that disappointment aversion leads
investors to reduce their exposure to the stock market (i.e., disappointment
aversion significantly depresses the portfolio weights on equities in all cases
considered). Our analysis also helps to determine the optimal weights between
the risky and risk–free assets for each considered markets. The key result that
emerges from our study is that optimal equity proportions around the world are
jointly determined by the levels of risk and disappointment aversion. Taken
together, these findings enhance our understanding of the sources of the
international equity premium puzzle.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents a
simple asset allocation framework under disappointment aversion, which draws
upon Ang et al. (2005). Section 3.3 provides details about the dataset utilized and
Section 3.4 presents our results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
2.2 The Disappointment Aversion Asset Allocation Framework
This section presents the classical asset allocation framework under
preferences that exhibit disappointment aversion (see Gul, 1991; Ang et al.,
2005). Drawing upon Ang et al. (2005), the utility maximization problem can be
and look–ahead. Given the nature of our study, which seeks to identify the drivers of the equity
premium around the world, an overstatement or understatement of the magnitude of the equity
premium could lead to misleading inferences. For example, an overestimated equity premium in
one market would suggest excessive investments in equities. Then the degree of disappointment
aversion would be exaggerated so that an “optimal” portfolio was maintained. The use of the DMS
database ensures that such problems do not apply in our empirical analysis.
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expressed as follows:
max
α∈[0,1]
U(µw). (2.1)
The DA utility is defined by
U(µw) =
µw∫
−∞
U(W )dF (W ) +A
∞∫
µw
U(W )dF (W )
Pr(W ≤ µw) +APr(W > µw) , (2.2)
where µw refers to the certain level of wealth that generates the same utility
determined by the optimal weights to equities. This is referred to as the certainty
equivalent. U(·) is the CRRA power utility in the form of U(W ) = W 1−γ/(1 − γ)
5; A is the coefficient of disappointment aversion (where 0 < A < 16). F (·) is the
cumulative distribution function for wealth W . The first–order condition (FOC)
for the DA investor is given by the following expression:
E
[
∂U(W )
∂W
(exp(y)− exp(r))1W≤µw
]
+AE
[
∂U(W )
∂W
(exp(y)− exp(r))1W>µw
]
,
(2.3)
where 1 is an indicator function and E refers to the expected value of the certainty
equivalent. According to Eq. (2.3) above, the DA utility function only concentrates
on the differentiation between terminal wealth levels and µw, and neither previous
losses nor gains will be taken into account directly. Let α represent the proportion
of equity investment. The ending period wealth (denoted by W ) is defined as
follows:
W = αW0(exp(y)− exp(r)) +W0exp(r). (2.4)
In this framework, the investor chooses between the risky asset y (i.e., equity) and
the risk–free asset r (i.e., Treasury bills). The term α refers to the proportion of
wealth invested in the risky asset while α∗ is the optimal weight. If µw is known,
5Using different forms of utility, empirical studies with similar preferences find consistent results.
For instance, within a classical power function, Barberis and Huang (2001) report a positive link
between loss aversion and stock returns. Similarly, by utilising a standardized two–piece power
function, Hwang and Satchell (2010) find a negative relationship between stock holdings and loss
aversion.
6To ease the comparison with Ang et al. (2005), the coefficient A is placed in front of elation;
this requires 0 < A < 1 to over–weight the disappointment. However, in Chapters 3 and 4,
the coefficient A is placed in front of disappointment so that A > 1 represents extra aversion to
disappointment.
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α∗ can be calculated by solving Eq. (2.3). The tricky part is that µw is also a
function of α, which means that a system of simultaneous equations has to be
solved (Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3)). In this study, we develop an algorithm of numerical
quadrature which converts Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) into the following form7:
µ1−γw =
∑
s:Ws≤µw
psW
1−γ
s +A
∑
s:Ws>µw
psW
1−γ
s
Pr(W ≤ µw) +APr(W > µw) , (2.5)∑
s:Ws≤µw
psW
−γ
s (exp(ys)−exp(r))+A
∑
s:Ws>µw
psW
−γ
s (exp(ys)−exp(r)) = 0. (2.6)
Using Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6), one can solve the optimal asset allocation problem and
determine the α∗. This can be done using a series of bisection searches to identify
the correct excess return interval and as a result determine the optimal weights8.
Solving the system above provides optimal weights that usually lie between the
interval [0, 1]. A value of α∗ that equals 0 implies that the optimal portfolio choice
includes no exposure to the equity market (i.e., risky asset). A value of α∗ that
equals 1 implies that all wealth is invested in equities. Our model is not restricted
to producing weights only within the [0, 1] interval. A negative weight implies
that investors anticipate under performance of the equity market, leading them
to take short (optimal) positions on equities. On the contrary, a weight greater
than 1 indicates that the optimal strategy involves borrowing for the purchase of
equity. As shown in Section 4.1, our algorithm produces optimal weights that are
similar to those obtained by Ang et al. (2005) in the case of the US market. The
aim of this chapter is to extend their framework to an international context and
examine the role of disappointment aversion in the equity premium puzzle around
the world.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For the empirical analysis, we use the Dimson–Marsh–Staunton (DMS)
database distributed by Morningstar. The main advantage of this database is that
it is free of ex–post selection bias, a common problem in the empirical literature
7See Appendix for details.
8Further details about the bisection search procedure can be found in Appendix B.
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on the equity premium puzzle. Our final sample is obtained by the 2012 Global
Investment Returns Yearbook9 and contains data spanning 112 years of history
(from 1900 to 2011) across 19 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Our final
sample comprises more than 85% of total market capitalization around the
world. In addition to the DMS database, we use return data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) in order to replicate the findings of Ang et al.
(2005) for the US market (see Section 2.4.1 for details). The main stock market
index in each case represents investments in the risky asset. For the risk–free
benchmark, we focus on T–bills issued in each country10.
Table 2.1 presents some descriptive statistics of our data. The equity premium
lies between 2.80% in Belgium and 6.50% in Australia. The annual equity return
on the US (UK) stock market is 6.20% (5.20%); this represents a notable 5.30%
(4.20%) premium over the US (UK) bills returns. At a global and European level,
the out performance of stocks over T–bills is 4.50% and 3.70%, respectively.
An interesting finding that emerges from Table 2.1 is that higher returns are
not always associated with higher volatilities (e.g., the highest volatility observed
in the German stock market (at 32.20%) is associated with one of the lowest
equity returns (at 2.90%)). One potential explanation is the following. Classic
asset pricing models such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe
(1964) and Lintner (1965) suggest that higher volatilities command higher
equity premiums. However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between
risk and return is still mixed and inconclusive. While a significant body of
research supports the traditional positive return–risk trade–off (e.g., see
Bollerslev et al., 1988; Harvey, 1989; Ghysels et al., 2005), another strand in the
literature reports results that reject this view (e.g., see Campbell, 1987; Breen
9See Credit Suisse: Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2012. This report is associated with
the work of Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton, whose book Triumph of the Optimists
(Princeton University Press, 2002) has had a major influence on investment analysis.
10Short–term T–bills (Treasury bills) are often backed by government finance which immunizes
them from defaults. The rates of T–bills could be regarded as a pure representation of the cost of
money. As a result, T–bills represent an appropriate proxy for the “risk–free” asset.
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et al., 1989). A third group of studies further suggests that the relation between
risk and return is time–varying (e.g., see French et al., 1987; Campbell and
Hentschel, 1992). We argue that one needs to go beyond risk aversion to fully
understand the nature of the risk–return trade–off. Put differently, investors are
not only concerned about volatility when making investment decisions, but also
about the frequency of outcomes that are worse than prior expectations. In what
follows, we demonstrate that, in addition to risk aversion, disappointment
aversion significantly suppresses equity holdings (i.e., investments in the risky
asset). In this way, our findings provide useful insights into the ambiguous
risk–return relationship.
[Insert TABLE 2.1 about here]
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Replicating the Optimal Portfolio Weights of Ang et al. (2005)
Before presenting the optimal portfolio weights for the cases considered in our
sample, we provide some preliminary evidence that confirms the validity of the
algorithm used in our study to solve the portfolio choice problem. In particular,
we try to replicate the optimal weights of Ang et al. (2005) for the case of the US
market. Given that our DA framework embeds an endogenous certainty equivalent
(see Gul, 1991; Ang et al., 2005), the impact of the rebalancing period becomes
less of an issue (see Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Fielding and Stracca, 2007). We
therefore focus on overall sample means to calculate the optimal weights. Table
2.2 presents the summary statistics of the data used in order to conduct such an
exercise. Over the 1926–1998 period, equities generated a nominal rate of return
of 2.66% per quarter (10.64% annualized). Over the same period, the annual rate
of return for T–bills was 4.08%. As expected, equities exhibited a much higher
standard deviation compared to T–bills (21.94% vs. 1.72%).
[Insert TABLE 2.2 about here]
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Table 2.3 presents the optimal weights produced from our algorithm and
compares them with those reported in Ang et al. (2005). For ease of comparison,
we present results for different levels of risk aversion (γ = 2 and γ = 5) and
disappointment aversion (from 0.65, which represents a high DA aversion, to 1,
which represents no DA aversion). Our optimal weights are very similar to those
reported in Ang et al. (2005). Some differences across certain values of A and γ
are due to differences in the investment horizon considered (horizon effect). The
weight differences (Diff) is obtained using (our weights – Ang’s weights)/Ang’s
weight. it tend to decrease as disappointment aversion declines, and essentially
disappear in the case when there is no DA aversion (A = 1). The results also
show that our weights are comparable to the ones in Ang et al. (2005) for
different levels of risk aversion (γ = 2 and γ = 5). Finally, it is interesting to note
our A∗ value (i.e., the lowest level of A before investors become unwilling to
invest any of their wealth in the equity market) is identical to the one reported in
Ang et al. (2005) (i.e., A∗ = 0.6030).
[Insert TABLE 2.3 about here]
2.4.2 Optimal Portfolio Weights
Based on return statistics listed in Table 2.1 (sourced from Credit Suisse:
Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2012), Table 2.4 reports the optimal
portfolio weights for each of the 19 countries considered in our sample. For ease
of comparison with Ang et al. (2005), it is reasonable to assume that relative risk
aversion γ is somewhere between 1 and 4. We let the initial coefficient equal 2
and report how the optimal weights change for different levels of disappointment
aversion. Panel A reports the results for Eurozone countries (Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain). Panel B reports the
optimal weights for European countries from outside the Eurozone area
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) while Panel C reports the
optimal weights for non–European countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, South Africa and the US) as well as two composite European and Global
indices.
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[Insert TABLE 2.4 about here]
The results support a strong negative relationship between the level of
disappointment aversion and the optimal weight of equities. This holds for all
countries considered. More specifically, the results in Panel A suggest that
investors should keep their equity exposure to a level higher than 50% (i.e., from
50.1% in Belgium to 78.5% in France) when preferences do not exhibit
disappointment aversion (A = 1). However, as the level of DA increases (i.e., A
declines), the optimal weight on equities becomes significantly lower and reaches
negative values for very high levels of DA (i.e., A ≤ 0.65). Also, the results show
significantly different A∗ values across countries. For example, the presence of
disappointment aversion depresses equity holdings more severely in Belgium
(A∗ = 0.744) than in France (A∗ = 0.629).
The negative relationship between disappointment aversion and equity
exposure is also obvious in Panels B and C. Investors in European countries from
outside the Eurozone area exhibit preferences that are characterized by a strong
disappointment aversion (i.e., A∗ > 0.677 in all cases), leading to relatively low
exposure to the equity market (e.g., the optimal weight turns to negative for the
case of Denmark at intermediate levels of DA, i.e., A = 0.75). Finally, the results
in Panel C confirm the negative relationship between the level of DA and equity
exposure in the case of non–European countries and, also, for portfolios
constructed on the basis of global/European equity indices. It is also worthwhile
to note that investors in Australia exhibit the lowest level of A∗ = 0.566 from all
cases considered, which drives the high exposure to the equity market (within
our hypothetical DA levels from 0.6 to 1, the optimal weight never becomes
negative). Also, Japanese investors maintain very conservative equity holdings
for most DA levels, but they start to purchase stocks just after A reaches 0.656,
showing a greater “tolerance” than investors from Canada (0.665) and New
Zealand (0.685). Taken together, the following inferences can be drawn so far.
First, the highest stock holdings are always associated with the case of no DA
(A = 1), with the equity market being incredibly attractive in countries such as
Australia, Canada, the US and South Africa. Second, the optimal weights are
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significantly depressed as the level of DA increases. Third, when DA reaches very
high levels, equity weights may even drop below zero, which means that an
optimal investment strategy involves shorting (rather than holding) equities.
Figure 2.1 depicts A∗ values against equity premiums. It seems that higher
equity premiums lead to smaller A∗ values for most countries. This implies that
investors are less concerned about disappointment aversion when stocks
significantly outperform T–bills. For example, France has a lower A∗ than
Belgium (0.629 vs. 0.774), which is due to a much higher equity premium
observed in the French equity market (5.7% vs. 2.8%). Moreover, it is also
evident that A∗ values are driven not only by equity premiums but also by
differences in stock market volatilities. Another example (see Finland vs. Italy)
might help to explain this further. While both countries have an identical equity
premium at 5.5%, the lower volatility of 29.0% in Italy (compared to 30.4% in
Finland) leads into a lower A∗ (0.657 vs. 0.658). The mechanism that drives
such a relationship is straightforward. Better market conditions (in the form of
higher mean returns or lower volatilities) make risky investments (exposure to
the equity market) more appealing. Investors therefore tend to be more resistant
towards disappointment aversion. Additionally, higher expectations toward
future profit opportunities may also attract new investors. Such effects help to
further reduce the value of A∗.
[Insert FIGURE 2.1 about here]
Figure 2.2 presents evidence supporting the view that optimal equity
proportions are jointly determined by the levels of risk and disappointment
aversion. Specifically, it provides a graphical representation of how the optimal
weight is affected by changes in both the levels of DA and risk aversion. A
separate graph is presented for each country considered. The 3D feature of these
graphs facilitates an understanding of how different combinations of
disappointment/risk aversion affect the level of equity holdings. The results
suggest a negative relationship between risk aversion and equity exposure in
cases when investors’ preferences do not exhibit disappointment aversion (i.e.,
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A = 1). For a given level of risk and disappointment aversion, equity exposure
tends to increase either due to a higher equity premium or due to a lower
standard deviation. Figure 2.2 also shows important differences in the shape of
the 3D graphs across countries. This is mainly due to variations in risk and
disappointment aversion, which both affect equity proportions in a non–linear
way. More specifically, optimal equity holdings decline along with a higher risk
aversion in a convex manner. This convexity is more pronounced at milder levels
of disappointment aversion (i.e., when A values are greater than 0.85). In
contrast, since the disappointment aversion parameter is multiplied by the
disappointment–utility, an increasing disappointment aversion depresses equity
holdings almost in a linear way. Furthermore, variations of disappointment
aversion lead into a stronger impact on stock holdings when risk aversion is
relatively low (i.e., for gamma values between 2 and 4). Overall, these findings
strongly support the view that assessing investors’ risk attitudes with both risk
and disappointment aversion grants a more reasonable solution to the equity
premium puzzle around the world.
[Insert FIGURE 2.2 about here]
2.5 Conclusion
Stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century by a surprisingly large
margin (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Such outperformance cannot be fully
justified in the context of standard portfolio choice models. Drawing upon the
portfolio choice model of Ang et al. (2005), which allows for disappointment
aversion (i.e., aversion to outcomes worse than prior expectations), this study
attempts to provide a “behavioural” explanation for the worldwide equity
premium. We firstly incorporate disappointment aversion in a simple theoretical
portfolio choice model. We generate an algorithm of numerical approximation to
solve the portfolio allocation problem and identify how optimal weights (i.e.,
equity exposure) relate to different levels of disappointment aversion. For the
empirical analysis, we consider the Dimson–Marsh–Staunton (DMS) database
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from Morningstar, which covers 19 countries over the period 1900–2011 and is
also free of ex–post selection bias. Our findings strongly support the view that, in
addition to the risk aversion, disappointment aversion further leads investors to
reduce their exposure to the stock market (i.e., disappointment aversion
significantly depresses the weights of equities in all cases considered). We further
show that optimal equity proportions are jointly determined by the levels of risk
and disappointment aversion. Taken together, findings of this chapter enhance
our understanding of the sources of the equity premium puzzle around the
world.
CHAPTER 2 29
2.6 Tables & Figures of This Chapter
Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics of Worldwide Equity Premiums
This table presents information about the level of equity premium for all countries
considered in our analysis over the period 1900–2011. All data is obtained from
the Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2012 and are also annualized.
Countries Equity Returns Bills Returns Equity premium Equity S.D.
Australia 7.20% 0.70% 6.50% 18.20%
Belgium 2.40% -0.40% 2.80% 23.60%
Canada 5.70% 1.60% 4.10% 17.20%
Denmark 4.90% 2.20% 2.70% 20.90%
Finland 5.00% -0.50% 5.50% 30.40%
France 2.90% -2.80% 5.70% 23.50%
Germany 2.90% -2.40% 5.30% 32.20%
Ireland 3.70% 0.70% 3.00% 23.10%
Italy 1.70% -3.60% 5.30% 29.00%
Japan 3.60% -1.90% 5.50% 29.80%
Netherlands 4.80% 0.70% 4.10% 21.80%
New Zealand 5.80% 1.70% 4.10% 19.70%
Norway 4.10% 1.20% 2.90% 27.30%
South Africa 7.20% 1.00% 6.20% 22.50%
Spain 3.40% 0.30% 3.10% 22.20%
Sweden 6.10% 1.80% 4.30% 22.90%
Switzerland 4.10% 0.80% 3.30% 19.70%
UK 5.20% 1.00% 4.20% 19.90%
US 6.20% 0.90% 5.30% 20.20%
Europe 4.60% 0.90% 3.70% 21.50%
World 5.40% 0.90% 4.50% 17.70%
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Table 2.2
S&P 500 and Treasury Bill Returns from CRSP
This table presents descriptive statistics on equity returns (from S&P 500) and
Treasury bill returns (90–day T–bills) over the period 1926–1998. This data is
obtained from CRSP and used to replicate the optimal weights of Ang et al. (2005)
for the case of the US market. All data are quarterly. Excess returns refer to stock
returns in excess of T–bill returns. Its quarterly mean and standard deviation are
calculated using the excess return series. Then the quarterly excess returns are
annualised by multiplying four. Likewise, the standard deviations of quarterly
excess returns are annualised by multiplying two.
Equity T–Bill Equity minus T–Bill
Mean Quarterly 2.66% 1.02% 1.64%
Annualized 10.64% 4.08% 6.56%
S.D. Quarterly 10.97% 0.86% 10.99%
Annualized 21.94% 1.72% 21.98%
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Table 2.3
Replicating the Optimal Weights of Ang et al. (2005)
This table presents the optimal weights produced from our algorithm and
compares them with those reported in Ang et al. (2005). For ease of comparison,
we present results for different values of risk aversion (γ = 2 and γ = 5). The
weight differences (Diff) is obtained using (our weights – Ang’s weights)/Ang’s
weight.
Curvature Parameter γ = 2 Curvature Parameter γ = 5
A Ang’s weights Our weights Diff. Ang’s weights Our weights Diff.
1.00 0.927 0.932 0.539% 0.370 0.372 0.541%
0.95 0.833 0.839 0.720% 0.332 0.335 0.904%
0.90 0.734 0.741 0.954% 0.293 0.296 1.024%
0.85 0.628 0.638 1.592% 0.250 0.254 1.600%
0.80 0.517 0.528 2.128% 0.206 0.210 1.942%
0.75 0.398 0.411 3.266% 0.158 0.164 3.797%
0.70 0.271 0.286 5.535% 0.108 0.114 5.556%
0.65 0.136 0.153 12.500% 0.054 0.061 12.963%
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Table 2.4
Optimal Portfolio Weights under Different A Values
This table reports the optimal portfolio weights for each of the 19 countries
considered in our analysis. For ease of comparison with Ang et al. (2005), we set
coefficient of risk aversion to 2 and report how the optimal weights change for
different levels of disappointment aversion.
Panel A: Optimal Weights for Countries from the Eurozone
A Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Nether- Spain
lands
0.600 -0.351 -0.118 -0.077 -0.103 -0.341 -0.120 -0.183 -0.343
0.650 -0.222 -0.016 0.056 -0.008 -0.208 -0.014 -0.041 -0.205
0.700 -0.101 0.079 0.180 0.082 -0.084 0.086 0.092 -0.076
0.750 0.014 0.168 0.296 0.166 0.033 0.180 0.218 0.047
0.800 0.122 0.253 0.406 0.246 0.144 0.268 0.336 0.162
0.850 0.225 0.333 0.509 0.322 0.249 0.352 0.447 0.271
0.900 0.322 0.408 0.606 0.393 0.348 0.431 0.552 0.374
0.950 0.414 0.480 0.698 0.461 0.442 0.506 0.651 0.472
1.000 0.501 0.548 0.785 0.525 0.531 0.577 0.745 0.565
A∗ 0.744 0.658 0.629 0.654 0.736 0.657 0.665 0.731
ERP 0.028 0.055 0.059 0.057 0.030 0.055 0.047 0.031
S.D. 0.236 0.304 0.235 0.322 0.231 0.290 0.218 0.222
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Table 2.4 (continued)
Optimal Portfolio Weights under Different A Values
This table reports the optimal portfolio weights for each of the 19 countries
considered in our analysis. For ease of comparison with Ang et al. (2005), we set
coefficient of risk aversion to 2 and report how the optimal weights change for
different levels of disappointment aversion.
Panel B: Optimal Weights for European Countries outside the Eurozone
A Denmark Norway Sweden Switzerland UK
0.60 -0.416 -0.291 -0.232 -0.35 -0.236
0.65 -0.269 -0.18 -0.097 -0.193 -0.08
0.70 -0.132 -0.076 0.029 -0.046 0.066
0.75 -0.002 0.023 0.148 0.092 0.203
0.80 0.12 0.117 0.26 0.222 0.333
0.85 0.236 0.205 0.366 0.345 0.454
0.90 0.345 0.289 0.466 0.461 0.569
0.95 0.449 0.369 0.561 0.571 0.678
1.00 0.548 0.444 0.651 0.676 0.781
A∗ 0.751 0.738 0.688 0.716 0.677
ERP 0.027 0.029 0.042 0.033 0.042
S.D. 0.209 0.273 0.229 0.197 0.199
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Table 2.4 (continued)
Optimal Portfolio Weights under Different A Values
This table reports the optimal portfolio weights for each of the 19 countries
considered in our analysis. For ease of comparison with Ang et al. (2005), we set
coefficient of risk aversion to 2 and report how the optimal weights change for
different levels of disappointment aversion.
Panel C: Optimal Weights for non–European Countries
A Australia Canada Japan New South US World Europe
Zealand Africa
0.60 0.125 -0.233 -0.113 -0.261 -0.037 -0.114 -0.19 -0.3
0.65 0.297 -0.052 -0.01 -0.104 0.102 0.04 -0.014 -0.156
0.70 0.458 0.118 0.087 0.044 0.232 0.185 0.151 -0.022
0.75 0.608 0.277 0.179 0.183 0.354 0.32 0.305 0.105
0.80 0.748 0.426 0.265 0.313 0.468 0.447 0.45 0.224
0.85 0.879 0.567 0.346 0.436 0.575 0.567 0.587 0.337
0.90 1.003 0.699 0.423 0.552 0.677 0.68 0.716 0.443
0.95 1.12 0.825 0.496 0.662 0.772 0.787 0.837 0.544
1.00 1.229 0.943 0.566 0.766 0.863 0.888 0.952 0.64
A∗ 0.566 0.665 0.656 0.685 0.613 0.637 0.654 0.708
ERP 0.065 0.041 0.056 0.04 0.062 0.052 0.044 0.036
S.D. 0.182 0.172 0.298 0.197 0.225 0.202 0.177 0.215
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Figure 2.1
Equity Risk Premium vs. Disappointment Aversion
This figure depicts the relationship between A∗ and equity risk premium. For ease
of comparison with Ang et al. (2005), we set the coefficient of risk aversion γ to
2.
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Figure 2.2
Optimal Weights under Different Risk and Disappointment Aversion
This figure presents the optimal weights for each case considered (19 countries
and two indices) across different levels of risk aversion (γ) and disappointment
aversion (A).
(a) Australia
(b) Belgium
(c) Canada
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Figure 2.2 (continued)
Optimal Weights under Different Risk and Disappointment Aversion
(d) Denmark
(e) Finland
(f) France
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Figure 2.2 (continued)
Optimal Weights under Different Risk and Disappointment Aversion
(g) Germany
(h) Ireland
(i) Italy
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Figure 2.2 (continued)
Optimal Weights under Different Risk and Disappointment Aversion
(j) Japan
(k) Netherlands
(l) New Zealand
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Figure 2.2 (continued)
Optimal Weights under Different Risk and Disappointment Aversion
(m) Norway
(n) South Africa
(o) Spain
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Figure 2.2 (continued)
Optimal Weights under Different Risk and Disappointment Aversion
(p) Sweden
(q) Switzerland
(r) United Kingdom
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Figure 2.2 (continued)
Optimal Weights under Different Risk and Disappointment Aversion
(s) United States
(t) Europe
(u) World
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Chapter 3
A Cross–Cultural Study of Financial
Risk–Taking: Individualism and
Disappointment Aversion around
the World
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3.1 Introduction
Since the introduction of disappointment aversion (DA henceforth) of Gul
(1991), the DA utility together with loss aversion has been widely used for the
explanation of investors’ behaviour in financial markets. These utility functions,
i.e., treating gains and losses rather than the total wealth and imposing heavier
weights on disappointment (losses) than elation (gains), have attracted a lot of
attention in the literature (e.g., Lien and Wang, 2002, 2003; Ang et al., 2005;
Fielding and Stracca, 2007; Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt, 2007; Routledge and Zin,
2010; Gill and Prowse, 2012). However, the detailed specifications of these
utility functions are not clear due to their unknown parameters, e.g., how
investors’ respond to disappointment. Other characteristics of DA utility such as
the relationship between DA and risk aversion or changes in DA to wealth levels
have yet to be investigated. The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise investors’
disappointment aversion and its impacts on asset pricing in order to answer these
questions.
We propose a utility function that consists of wealth (consumption) utility as
well as DA utility, as in Koszegi and Rabin (2007) and Barberis (2013). The
wealth utility reflects the absolute utility from wealth levels which has been used
in economics and finance, whereas the DA utility depends on gains and losses
calculated with respect to the (endogenous) expected wealth. Our overall utility
would help avoid misleading results by ignoring either gains and losses or wealth
levels (Barberis, 2013). By interpreting the DA utility as a risk measure (Jia and
Dyer, 1996) and assuming that utility is additively separable as in Koszegi and
Rabin (2007). We analytically obtain several interesting relationships between the
optimal investment proportions, levels of DA and risk aversion, expected excess
returns, elation, and disappointment. The analytical relationships are then tested
using asset allocations of pension funds in 35 OECD countries.
We find that the effects of risk and disappointment on asset allocation are
different. Ceteris paribus, optimal investment proportions in risky assets decrease
when investors become more risk-averse, but increase when investors become
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more disappointment-averse. The former is well known: investors would not
take additional risk unless properly compensated. The latter, however, seems
counter-intuitive: investors who are more disappointment–averse would invest
more in risky assets. But the counter–intuitive results are indeed consistent with
the experimental findings of Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt (2007), because
disappointment aversion increases when expected excess returns increase. That
is, investors are particularly frustrated for suffering losses when they have a very
good chance to win. Therefore, in bull markets when expected excess returns are
high, both investment proportions in risky assets and disappointment aversion
are high. With respect to wealth levels, if risk aversion decreases with wealth,
i.e., decreasing absolute risk aversion holds, wealthier investors may feel more
disappointment for losses.
These analytical results are supported by empirical results with asset allocation
in pension funds of 35 OECD countries. The estimated DA levels (standard errors)
of equities, bonds, and other investments (a portfolio of real estate, infrastructure,
private equities and hedge funds) are 2.28 (0.31), 1.64 (0.17) and 1.93 (0.24),
respectively. As predicted by the analytical results, DA is larger for equities whose
expected returns are larger than those of the other risky assets. The large DA in
equities could be a potential source of equity premium puzzle which is not well
explained by risk.
The levels of DA are affected by wealth as well as individualism. As predicted
by the analytical results, countries with larger wealth (measured by GDP) show
higher levels of disappointment aversion for equities. Moreover, individualism of
Hofstede (2001), a cultural character, appears to affect disappointment aversion.
Individualistic countries appear to be more disappointment–averse than
collectivistic countries. According to Van Den Steen (2004); Chui et al. (2010),
individualistic investors tend to show more risk-taking activities in financial
markets. Our results indicate that overconfidence of individualistic investors
increases their expectations in risky assets, making themselves more
disappointed for losses.
This study expands our understanding of disappointment aversion and its
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relationship with risk aversion and expected returns. The utility function we use
for the asset allocation problem is a generalised one in the sense that it includes
the aggregated wealth level as well as gains and losses. In contrast to other
disappointment aversion utility functions defined solely over gains and losses,
our utility also depend on the absolute pleasure of consumption purchased with
wealth. Moreover, the assumption of additively separable utility allows us to
apply the asset allocation problem for multiple risky assets11. In our framework,
the overall utility is a linear combination of disappointment aversion utilities for
multiple risky assets, and thus analysis becomes quite simple.
From the empirical side, our results show that cultural differences can play an
important role in decision–making under risk, which is consistent with the view
that investors from different backgrounds frame their risk attitude in different
ways and are subject to psychological biases (e.g., Chui et al., 2010; Beugelsdijk
and Frijns, 2010; Frijns et al., 2013; Breuer et al., 2014). In this study we show
that disappointment aversion is also affected by cultural differences. The
variation in disappointment aversion due to cultural difference challenges the
traditional risk-based theories and contributes a new dimension to current
behavioural literature.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: in section 3.2 we
propose our utility function and show how optimal asset allocation in risky assets
are affected by risk and disappointment aversion. In section 3.3 we empirically
test various analytical results developed in section 2. Section 3.4 focuses on
discussions of the obtained results and concludes this chapter.
3.2 Disappointment Aversion in Asset Allocation
In this section, we propose a DA utility with subjective probability function and
investigate how assets are allocated with respect to disappointment aversion. As in
Koszegi and Rabin (2007), investors’ utility is assumed to depend on their multi–
dimensional wealth portfolios (bundle) as well as reference portfolios under the
11Because of tractability, most previous studies focus on asset allocation problems with two assets,
i.e., Benartzi and Thaler (1995); Ang et al. (2005); Fielding and Stracca (2007); Hwang and
Satchell (2010).
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assumption that utility is additively separable across different asset classes. We
propose some analytical results between investment patterns, risk aversion, and
disappointment aversion.
3.2.1 The Disappointment Aversion Utility
The DA utility is embedded in the asymmetric preference towards outcomes
that do not meet a person’s prior expectation (disappointment) and those that
exceed the expectation (elation): it predicts that the person reacts more sensitively
to disappointment than to elation. Unlike loss aversion where the reference point
is predetermined exogenously, the reference point in DA is endogenously decided
depending on future return paths. Therefore, it is possible that the person still
suffers disappointment even for a positive outcome if the outcome is lower than
his expectations (reference points).
While the asymmetric preference with respect to disappointment and elation
is a core of the DA utility, consumption levels are also what people care about.
For example, Koszegi and Rabin (2007) propose a utility function in which
consumption utility is considered in addition to the utility from gains and losses.
As argued by Barberis (2013), neglecting consumption surely leads to biased
conclusions. Therefore, our DA utility ((u(W,µs)) consists of the typical wealth
utility and the disappointment–elation utility12. Formally, we have:
u(W,µs) = µw − ϕ
[
A |W − µw |v I−− |W − µw |v (1− I)−
]
, (3.1)
where µw is the expected wealth, W represents the end–of–period wealth, and I−
is an indicator variable that equals one when W −µw < 0 and zero otherwise. For
DA, A > 1 is required to give extra weights to the disappointment.
The first component of the DA utility is the expected end–of–period wealth
µw which represents utility from consumption via wealth. Similar to the models
of Koszegi and Rabin (2007), wealth utility (expected wealth) is differentiable
and strictly increasing. Our DA utility increases linearly with expected wealth,
12For an application of DA utility in the asset allocation problem, we use the wealth level to
represent future consumption which is readily observable.
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satisfying the non–satiation condition and allowing our model to be tractable
(Barberis, 2013). The second component inside the square brackets in Eq. (3.1),
which we refer to as the disappointment–elation utility, represents utility derived
from gains and losses. The disappointment–elation utility, is also interpreted as a
“standard measure of risk” (Jia and Dyer, 1996) or a performance measure
(Gemmill et al., 2004). The parameter, ϕ > 0, thus, shows the relative
importance of risk in the utility and represents the trade–off relationship between
wealth utility and risk: it is equivalent to a measure of risk aversion, which
should decrease as wealth increases if decreasing absolute risk aversion holds.
The curvature parameter, v, decides convexity or concavity of elation and
disappointment with respect to gains and losses, respectively. As in many
previous studies, the two curvature parameters for gains and losses are set
equivalent to each other (e.g., see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Abdellaoui,
2000; Barberis et al., 2001; Ang et al., 2005; Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt, 2007).
Finally, expected wealth is used as the reference point in this study. As pointed
out by Koszegi and Rabin (2007), expected wealth is what people use to
calculate gains and losses and is determined by rational expectations held in the
recent past about outcomes.
3.2.2 Subjective Weighting Function
It is well–documented that people distort probabilities by disproportionately
directing their attention to outcomes (Prelec, 1998). According to Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), unlikely extreme outcomes are overweighted while highly
possible events are underweighted. Quiggin (1995) introduces a rank–dependent
utility model where weights depend on the true probability of an outcome as
well as its ranking relative to other outcomes. The combination of rank and
reference point–dependent utility gave birth to cumulative prospect theory
(CPT), which utilizes a transformed probability weighting function to account for
the redistribution of decision weights (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
In order to simulate investors’ subjective weights, we use Prelec’s (1998) single
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parameter version of the weighting function:
w(p) = exp[−(ln(p))δ], (3.2)
where p is the cumulative probability of any possible outcome. With δ (0 <
δ < 1), the weighting function allocates more (fewer) weights to unlikely (likely)
outcomes. A number of weighting functions (e.g., Prelec, 1998; Abdellaoui, 2000;
Luce et al., 2000; Bruhin et al., 2010) have been proposed but they are quite
similar to the weighting function of Prelec (1998), (see Gonzalez and Wu (1999)
for example).
Although the rationale behind the subjective weighting is different from risk
attitude toward gains and losses, they are closely connected. To see this, assume
a transformed density function for elation and disappointment, pi+(x) and pi−(x),
respectively, as follows:
pi+(x) = w′(1− p)pdf(x),
pi−(x) = w′(p)pdf(x),
where x = W − µw represents gains or losses, pdf(x) is the probability density
function of x; w′(1 − p) and w′(p) are the first derivatives of Prelec’s (1998)
weighting functions at the cumulative probabilities of 1− p and p, respectively:
W ′(1− p) = δ
1− p [(−ln(1− p))
δ−1exp(−(−ln(1− p))δ)], x ≥ 0,
W ′(p) =
δ
p
[(−lnp)δ−1exp(−(−lnp)δ)], x < 0,
Then the expected DA utility can be presented as:
UDA = E[u(W,µw)] = µw − ϕ[Apu− − (1− p)u+],
where p represents the cumulative probability at the reference point (x = 0), i.e.,
p = F (0), and
(1− p)u+ =
∫ ∞
0
xvpi+(x)dx,
pu− =
∫ 0
−∞
(−x)vpi−(x)dx
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The subjective weighting function is designed to replicate the probability
distortion of outcomes, but alters the degree of risk attitude towards gains and
losses for a given objective probability: for example,
xv[w′(p)pdf(x)] = [xvw′(p)]pdf(x). In other words, for a given objective
probability, when combined with outcomes, the subjective weighting function
creates concavity (risk aversion) for losses while it creates convexity (risk–loving)
for gains. Even though the risk aversion for gains and risk–loving for losses are
assumed for a given subjective weighting function, the net effects of the risk
attitude and the subjective weighting function become unclear for a given
objective probability.
Because of this lack of clarity between risk attitude and subjective weighting,
it is difficult to estimate these two parameters simultaneously, i.e., the parameter
of the weighting function and the curvature parameter. Moreover, as explained
later, the DA parameter, A, is also closely associated with these two parameters.
In order to minimize the difficulties in the estimation but keep the original
rationale behind the DA utility and subjective weighting, we estimate DA for
given subjective weighting and curvature. More specifically, we use δ = 0.74 for
the subjective weighting as in Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Hofstede’s (2001)
“Uncertainty Avoidance” index for risk attitude, the details of which will be
discussed later.
3.2.3 An Application to an Asset Allocation Problem
We consider an asset allocation problem for multiple asset classes, which is an
extension of the typical asset allocation problem where only two types of assets
(equity and risk–free asset) are considered (e.g., Ang et al., 2005; Fielding and
Stracca, 2007; Hwang and Satchell, 2010). Suppose that the end–of–period
wealth W is an outcome of a portfolio q where α1, α2, ..., αn of wealth are
invested in n types of risky asset, and the remaining (1 −∑ni=1 αi) is invested in
the risk–free asset. Short positions are not allowed in a typical asset allocation in
pension funds, suggesting 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 for the i type of asset. Without loss of
generality and for tractability, we assume that the initial wealth is 1. Let ri and rf
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be the return of asset i and risk–free asset. Then, the end–of–period wealth is
given by:
W = 1 + rq = 1 + rf +
n∑
i=1
αi(ri − rf ),
and the expected wealth is:
E(W ) = µw = 1 + µq = 1 + rf +
n∑
i=1
αi(µi − rf ),
where µi ≡ E(ri) and gains and losses with respect to the expected wealth can be
calculated by:
W − µw =
n∑
i=1
αi(ri − µi). (3.3)
For simplicity and tractability, the disappointment–elation utility (the second
component in the equation) is assumed to be additively separable across
different asset types as in Koszegi and Rabin (2007). Then each of the
disappointment–elation utility can be specified with its own curvature and DA
parameters. Previous studies show that asset allocation is not sensitive to
changes in the curvature parameters (Ang et al., 2005; Abdellaoui and
Bleichrodt, 2007), and thus we assume that curvature parameters are the same
for different asset types. However, DA may be different for different asset types.
For example, investors may be more disappointment–averse for a class of assets
with a higher premium, which is more intuitive than assuming a single DA
regardless of asset types. When the disappointment–elation utility is additively
separable and disappointment aversion differs for different asset types, the
expected DA utility in Eq. (3.1) appears as follows:
UDA = µw = ϕ
[
n∑
i=1
Aiα
v
i piu
−
i −
n∑
i=1
αvi (1− pi)u+i
]
, (3.4)
where the number of individual risky assets in the portfolio is n. More specifically,
Ai and αi are the level of DA of asset i and its investment proportion, respectively.
Realised elation or disappointment of asset i is expressed as xi = ri − µi, where
1− pi is the probability of having a positive xi.
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Proposition 1 Under the above utility setting in Eq. (3.4), when v > 1 and
αi ∈ [0, 1], the optimal investment proportion with respect to risky asset i exists as:
α∗i =
(
−ϕv
(
(1− pi)u+i −Aipiu−i
)
µi − rf
) 1
v−1
(3.5)
Proof. Investors who try to maximise their expected DA utility have to decide each
αi for their overall utility. Namely, it is an optimization problem under n unknown
variables. The gradient of the DA utility with respect to {α1, ..., αi, ..., αn} written
∇UDA, is a vector:
∇UDA = ∂UDA
∂αi
= (µi − rf )− ϕvαv−1i
(
Aipiu
−
i − (1− pi)u+i
)
= 0. (3.6)
Then the optimal investment proportions {α∗1, ...α∗2, ..., α∗n} can be obtained by
solving ∇UDA(α∗i ) = 0. Rearranging Eq. (3.5) for Ai, we have
Ai =
µi − rf
ϕvpiu
−
i
(α∗i )
1−v +
(1− pi)u+i
piiu
−
i
(3.7)
The second partials of UDA are arranged into the Hessian matrix H(α):
H(α) =

∂2UDA
∂α21
∂2UDA
∂α1∂α2
... ∂
2UDA
∂α1∂αn
∂2UDA
∂α2∂α1
∂2UDA
∂α22
... ∂
2UDA
∂α2∂αn
...
...
. . .
...
∂2UDA
∂αn∂α1
∂2UDA
∂αn∂α2
... ∂
2UDA
∂α2n

For critical points obtained in Eq. (3.5), a global maximum exists if the DA
function is concave, i.e., H(α) needs to be negative-definite. Since for i 6= j,
∂2UDA
∂αi∂αj
=
∂2UDA
∂αj∂αi
= 0, (3.8)
H(α) becomes a diagonal matrix whose elements are:
∂2UDA
∂α2i
= αv−2i ϕv(v − 1)
(
(1− pi)u+i −Aipiu−i
)
,
which becomes
∂2UDA
∂α2i
|ai=a∗i = −(µi − rf )(v − 1) < 0.
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As expected, returns of risky assets should be higher than the risk-free rate, which
means µi − rf > 0. Therefore the optimal investment proportion in Eq. (3.5)
satisfies the necessary and sufficient condition when v > 1. QED
The results are interesting because v > 1 implies that investors are
risk–seeking in gains and risk–averse in losses. Although simple models without
the expected wealth or with the assumption of v = 1 are popular in the literature
for their tractability, they often produce corner solutions in asset allocation
problems (e.g., Ang et al., 2005; Hwang and Satchell, 2010). As in Barberis et al.
(2001), this problem can be avoided by including the expected wealth and
allowing v > 1.
The properties of DA can be further investigated with the following two
propositions. These are useful when αi is not known.
Proposition 2 For the DA utility defined in Eq. (3.4), when αi is restricted with
αi ∈ [0, 1] and Proposition 1 holds, then the lower bound of any “Ai” exists at
Ai ≥ µi − rf
ϕvpiu
−
i
+
(1− pi)µ+i
piu
−
i
. (3.9)
Proof. As we know v > 1 and 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, Eq. (3.5) gives
0 ≤
(
µi − rf
ϕv(Aipiu
−
i − (1− pi)u+i
) v−1
1
≤ 1
since 1v−1 > 0,
(µi − rf ) < ϕv(Aipiu−i − (1− pi)u+i ),
and the result follows. QED
Proposition 3 For each type of risky asset i in the optimal utility, the elasticity of
“Ai” with respect to those of u−i , (1− pi), ϕ and the expected excess return (µi − rf )
is given by:
elasticity with respect to u−i :
∂lnAi
∂lnu−i
= −1 < 0,
semi-elasticity with respect to (1− pi):
∂lnAi
∂(1− pi) =
(µi − rf )αi + vϕαvi u+i
pi(µi − rf )αi + (1− pi)pivϕαvi u+i
> 0,
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elasticity with respect to ϕ:
∂lnAi
∂lnϕ
=
−(µi − rf )αi
(µi − rf )αi + (1− pi)vϕαvi u+i
< 0,
and the semi-elasticity with respect to the expected excess return (µi − rf ):
∂lnAi
∂(µi − rf ) =
αi
(µi − rf )αi + ϕvαvi (1− pi)u+i
> 0.
Proof. By differentiating Eq. (3.7) with respect to lnu−i , (1− pi), ϕ and (µi − rf )
we have the results. QED
The propositions suggest several important implications of the effects of
market conditions on the level of DA; when the DA parameter Ai changes in
proportion to its lower bound, it increases when the premium µi − rf increases.
When the ratio of elation to disappointment increases (the ratio of (1 − pi)u+i
with respect to piu−i ) or when ϕ decreases. The results indicate that investors
become more disappointment–averse as the premium (the expected return in
excess of risk–free rate) increases in bull markets. This is consistent with the
result that DA increases with the probability of gains (Proposition 3).
It is interesting to find in Proposition 3 that investors become more
disappointment–averse if the chances of disappointment (losses) are expected to
decrease. The results are comparable with the well–known house money effects
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990) whereby investors tend to be more risk–averse after
losses than after gains. However, our results differ from the house money effects
because they depict the relationship between risk attitude and ex–ante
disappointment.
We also find that wealthier investors who are less risk–averse become more
disappointment–averse. When the disappointment-elation utility is interpreted as
risk (Jia and Dyer, 1996), investors would become less risk–averse, i.e., a smaller
value of ϕ, as their wealth increases, if risk aversion is expected to decrease with
wealth (decreasing absolute risk aversion). This means that wealthy investors
suffer higher disutility from disappointing outcomes despite their tendency of less
risk aversion.
Proposition 4 For the optimal utility in Eq. (3.5), the elasticities of α∗i with
respect to the optimal Ai, the premium (µi − rf ), and ϕ are given by
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∂lnα∗i
∂lnAi
=
piu
−
i
((1− pi)u+i −Aipiu−i )(v − 1)
< 0,
∂lnα∗i
∂ln(µi − rf ) =
1
v − 1 > 0,
∂lnα∗i
∂lnϕ
=
1
1− v < 0.
The semi-elasticity of α∗ to p is given by
∂lnα∗i
∂pi
=
Aiu
−
i
((1− pi)u+i −Aipiu−i )(1− v)
> 0.
Proof. By taking the natural logarithm of Eq. (3.5) and differentiating with
respect to corresponding variables, we have the results. QED
The result in Proposition 2 indicates that (1−pi)u+i −Aipiu−i < 0 since the risk
premium should be positive. Therefore, when v > 1, Proposition 4 shows that the
elasticity of the optimal investment in the risky asset decreases as DA increases. It
also decreases when investors become more risk–averse. On the other hand, the
elasticity of the optimal proportion in the risky asset increases with the expected
premium or the probability of positive returns. The results are consistent with our
intuition.
3.2.4 Disappointment Aversion and Individualism
Since the cross-cultural empirical work by Hofstede (2001), a growing
number of studies have found how cultural characters affects asset pricing and
financial risk-taking behaviour. For example, by conducting a cross-country
investigation on foreign asset allocation of 26 countries, Beugelsdijk and Frijns
(2010) demonstrate that more individualistic countries are more aggressive in
foreign investment; Breuer et al. (2014) examine the risk-taking willingness from
a total of 449 economic students via a specifically designed survey, and find that
individualism increases financial risk-taking. Another set of papers, including
Markus and Kitayama (1991); Van Den Steen (2004); Chui et al. (2010),
suggests that individualism can lead to overconfidence, resulting in excessive
over-optimism towards future returns. These empirical studies again support a
positive relationship between individualism and risk-taking activities.
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The risk-taking activities by individualistic investors are associated with DA.
According to Chui et al. (2010), risk–return relationship perceived by investors is
negatively driven by overconfidence. Our results in Propositions 2 and 3 show that
DA increases when risk becomes less important, i.e., ϕ decreases. Therefore, if a
risk-taking tendency increases with overconfidence as in the previous literature,
our results indicate that overconfidence represented by individualism may lead to
more disappointment when losses occur.
3.3 Empirical Tests
We test the analytical results in the previous section using asset allocation in
pension funds across countries. In particular, DA is investigated if it is associated
with cross-cultural character aspects such as individualism.
3.3.1 Asset allocation and Returns across Countries
We have collected asset allocations of pension funds across 35 countries for
the period from 2005 to 201213. The reason we use pension fund data is twofold.
Fist, pension funds are key players in the global investment industry. According
to OECD Pensions Statistics (2013), in 2012, institutional investors in the OECD
totalled USD 78.2 trillion1 in 2012, with USD 30.0 trillion coming from
investment funds, USD 24.5 trillion from insurance companies, USD 21.8 trillion
from pension funds and USD 1.9 trillion from other investors (see Figure 3.1).
[Insert FIGURE 3.1 about here]
Secondly, the role of culture in pension fund managers’ behaviour has only
recently been investigated at the micro level (Beckmanna et al., 2008); controlling
for the interaction of culture with DA at the aggregate level (i.e. the pension
funds’ sector as a whole in each country) in our study can offer novel insights in
this debate by allowing us to better understand the issue at the aggregate level.
The number of countries is restricted by the data availability of pension funds,
13Our original goal is to include asset allocations of pension funds from 2003 to 2012, so that it
perfectly matches the sampling period of asset returns. However, this is not feasible because the
data quality worsens rapidly for those years prior to 2005.
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individualism, and returns of the asset classes we consider in this study. Four types
of asset classes, i.e., risk-free assets, stocks, bonds, and others, are investigated with
their 120 monthly returns for the sample period from 2003 to 2012.
The weights α∗i in each asset type are collected from OECD Global Pension
Statistics (GPS)14, where national asset allocations of pension funds are
maintained and updated annually. Table 3.1 reports the average weights on asset
classes for each country during our sampling period. On average, 45.8% of
pension funds is invested in bonds, followed by others (25.1%), and equities
(20.6%). Investment in others tends to increase while the weight in equities
decreases, in particular, after the financial crisis of 2008. Before the financial
crisis of 2008, the proportion of other investments decreased from 32.09%
(2005) to 21.24% (2008) while the equity weight increased from 16.10% (2005)
to 21.59% (2008). However, their performance reversed after the crisis: until
2010, the weight in other investments rebounded to 28.61% whereas the equity
exposure is still below the crisis-level at 21.52%. Proportions with respect to
bonds and cash & deposits are relatively less sensitive to time.
[Insert TABLE 3.1 about here]
Returns of the four asset classes are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters
DataStream database. Equity returns are calculated from the composite index of
the major stock exchange in each country. The summary statistics of annualised
log-returns of four asset classes are reported in Table 3.2. The average annual
equity return (standard deviation) of the 35 countries is 9.38% (21.04%).
Notably, although often accompanied by large volatilities, most of the emerging
markets show higher returns in recent years. For example, the average annual
returns of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey all exceed
15% (particularly the top return, 21.12% in Mexico), which are far beyond some
of the developed market such as Japan (2.01%). However, equity performance in
Greece and Slovenia is poor during our sample period.
14This dataset includes pension funds statistics with OECD classifications by type of pension plans
and by type of pension funds. All types of plans are included (occupational and personal, mandatory
and voluntary).
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Bond returns are calculated with equal weight on the total returns of
government and corporate bonds. Ten-year benchmark government bonds are
used as government bonds15. On the other hand, the quality of corporate bond
data is not as good as that of the government bond data, in particular among
emerging markets. To mitigate this defect, we consider three international
indices: FTSE Euro Corporate Bond Index16for those developed markets outside
the Eurozone (Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Japan and Norway); IBoxx Euro
Corp. Bond Index17 for countries within the Eurozone (Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and
Spain); and finally, BofA–Merrill Lynch Emerging Markets Corporate Plus Index18
for emerging markets (Mexico, Poland, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand and
Turkey). For the remaining countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, Korea, the
UK and the US), country–specific indices can be found. The average annual bond
return (standard deviation) for all countries is 6.29% (4.75%). As expected, the
return difference in bonds is less than that of stocks. The highest average annual
bond return comes from the Czech Republic at 12.98%, whereas the lowest is
recorded at 2.94% in Greece.
In addition to stocks and bonds, significant proportions of pension funds are
invested in other investment vehicles which include, but are not limited to loans,
land and buildings, unallocated insurance contracts, hedge funds, private equity
funds, structured products and other mutual funds. Such a wide variety poses
enormous difficulties in tracking the performance of each asset class in each
country. Moreover, details of investment proportions in these other investment
15The data of 10-year government bonds is non-applicable in the case of Turkey, hence a similar
bond price index with a 5-year maturity is applied.
16The FTSE Euro Corporate Bond Index includes Euro-denominated issues from global corporate
entities with all maturities ranging from 1 to 3 years to more than 15 years. Each bond is classified
under the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). The index constituents are investment grade
debt with a minimum rating of BBB-.
17IBoxx Euro Corp. Bond Index is prepared and published by Market, which is an ideal
performance benchmark for fixed income research, asset allocation and performance evaluation.
This index includes overall, rating and maturity indices, with a split into financial and non–financial
bonds, and rating and maturity sub–indices for each.
18The BofA–Merrill Lynch Emerging Markets Corporate Plus Index tracks the performance of
US dollar (USD) and Euro-denominated emerging markets’ non–sovereign debt publicly issued
within the major domestic and Eurobond markets. The index includes corporate and quasi–
government debt of qualifying countries, but excludes sovereign and supranational debt. Other
types of securities acceptable for inclusion in this index are: original–issue zero coupon bonds.
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vehicles are not known. Therefore, we construct an index using MSCI World Real
Estate 19, Dow Jones Brookfield GLB INFRA20, S&P Listed Private Equity21 and
HFRI Fund of Funds Composite22 for real estates, infrastructure, hedge funds,
and private equities in US dollars, respectively. These four return series are
equally weighted to create the “others” asset class, which are then converted to
returns for each country using its exchange rate with respect to the US dollar.
The average annualised return (standard deviation) for other investments is
8.44% (24.58%).
Finally, for the risk–free rates, we use 30–day T–bill rates. If T–bill returns are
not available, 30–day interbank rates or repo–rates are used. Countries within
the Eurozone share an identical interbank rate. All data is collected from the
DataStream except the US, where a better alternative can be found in the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Notably, extremely high short–term
interest rates are observed in some countries due to their particular financial
policies or rapid capital growth. For example, the average risk–free rates in
Brazil, Iceland, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey are all over 8.0%. In some
cases, high risk–free rates produce negative excess returns for some countries
rendering abnormal DA that will be discussed later.
[Insert TABLE 3.2 about here]
19The MSCI World Real Estate Price Index is a free float–adjusted market capitalization index that
consists of large and mid–cap equity REITs across 23 developed markets, which generate a majority
of their revenue and income from real estate rental and leasing operations. With 101 constituents,
it represents about 85% of the REIT universe in each country and all securities are classified in the
REIT sector according to the Global Industry Classification Standard.
20Dow Jones Brookfield GLB INFRA is maintained collaboratively by S&P Dow Jones Indices and
Brookfield Asset Management. It aims to measure the stock performance of companies worldwide
whose primary business is the ownership and operation of (rather than service of) infrastructure
assets. To be included in the indices, a company must have more than 70% of estimated cash
flows (based on publicly available information) derived from eight infrastructure sectors: airports,
toll roads, ports, communications, electricity transmission & distribution, oil & gas storage &
transportation and water.
21The S&P Listed Private Equity Index comprises the leading listed private equity companies that
meet specific size, liquidity, exposure, and activity requirements. The index is designed to provide
tradable exposure to the leading publicly–listed companies that are active in the private equity
space.
22The HFRI Fund of Funds Composite is a series of benchmarks designed to reflect hedge fund
industry performance by constructing equally weighted composites of constituent funds, as reported
by the hedge fund managers listed within the HFR Database. The HFRI ranges in breadth from the
industry–level view of the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index, which encompasses over 2000
funds, to the increasingly specific level of the sub–strategy classifications.
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3.3.2 Individualism and Risk Aversion
In addition to the asset allocation data and return data, we use risk aversion
and individualism of each country to investigate DA.
As reported in Ang et al. (2005) and Xie et al. (2014), and also discussed in the
previous section, optimal asset allocations are jointly influenced by risk aversion
and DA, and thus estimating the DA parameter (Ai) and the two risk aversion
parameters (ϕ and v) at the same time is not a feasible option. In this study, we
estimate the DA parameter for given (exogenous) risk aversion.
We refer to Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance (unav)23 as a measure of risk
aversion in each country. Although Hofstede (2001) does not directly link the
uncertainty avoidance to the risk perception, several studies have accumulated
abundant evidence about how it affects risk preferences. For example, Kwok and
Tadesse (2006) show that countries with stronger uncertainty avoidance are
characterized by a bank–based financial system (relatively risk–averse). In
contrast, countries with milder uncertainty avoidance are characterized by a
market–based financial system (relatively risk–seeking). Chui and Kwok (2008)
suggest that uncertainty–avoiding nations tend to spend more money on life
insurance. Frijns et al. (2013), empirically, show that firms located in countries
with lower risk–tolerance (measured by uncertainty avoidance scores) require
higher premiums on takeovers. Taken together the above findings suggest a
positive relationship between uncertainty–avoidance and risk–aversion.
The two parameters (ϕ and v) are calculated using the following conversion:
ϕ =
unav
Cϕ
,
v = 1 +
Cv
unav
,
where the the two parameters are initially set to Cϕ = 50 and Cv = 10. As unav
(ϕ) increases, risk becomes important in the DA utility, indicating a risk–averse
attitude. Similarly, countries with higher unav show fewer risk–seeking patterns,
23The uncertainty avoidance reflects the extent to which people feel either uncomfortable or
comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured situations may be novel, unknown, surprising,
and different from usual.
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i.e., lower v. Table 3.3 reports all countries’ uncertainty avoidance scores along
with the scaled set of (ϕ, v) with Cϕ = 50 and Cv = 10. With respect to the 35
countries we consider in this study, the conversion makes the values of ϕ and v
range as follows: 0.46 < ϕ < 2.24 and 1.09 < v < 1.43. More sets of Cϕ and Cv
are tested later to examine the robustness of our results.
[Insert TABLE 3.3 about here]
We use Hofstede’s Individualism Index (Indv) to investigate if individualism
has a relationship with DA. The index is based on a psychological survey of
88,000 IBM worldwide employees, and widely used in the literature as a measure
of the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups24. In the spirit of
Hofstede’s Indv, we explore the extent to which cross–country variations in DA
can be explained by this measure. The 35 countries are further divided into three
groups: the Collectivism group includes countries with individualism indices less
than 40; individualism scores between 40 and 65 are arranged into Median; the
rest of countries with individualism indices over 65 are labelled to Individualism.
All countries along with their individualism indices are reported in Table 3.4.
According to Table 3.4, the Indv–index is regionally orientated: most of the
developed countries in Western Europe and North American fall into the
Individualism group while the Collectivism group consists of many emerging
markets from Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America. The Median group, on
the other hand, stands in the middle of a mixture, including both developed and
emerging countries from Asia, Europe and Africa.
[Insert TABLE 3.4 about here]
24A higher value of Indv indicates a more individualistic society, where individuals are expected to
take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Its opposite, lower Indv scores, represent
a collective society in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular
in–group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A society’s position on this
dimension is reflected in whether people’s self–image is defined in terms of “I” or “we”. Hofstede’s
Indv are calculated from six work–goal questions out of the total 14 questions about candidates’
work and private life.
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3.3.3 Cross–Country Disappointment Aversion
We estimate the level of disappointment aversion for each country using asset
allocations in Table 3.1 and the subjective probability weighting parameter
δ = 0.74 using bootstrapping method. For each country, 120 monthly returns are
randomly sampled with replacement from the historical 120 monthly
observations of the ten year period from 2003 to 2012. Under the assumption
that asset returns follow the normal distribution, a value of DA is calculated for
the investment weight (average investment proportions over the period from
2005 to 2012). We repeat this process 1,000 times to obtain 1,000 estimates of
DA for each asset class and country. Panels A, B and C in Table 3.5 report the
average values of the 1,000 DA estimates for stocks, bonds and other
investments, respectively. In addition, using the same bootstrapping method, we
also calculate and report the minimal level of DA (A−) defined in Eq. (3.9).
Glancing at these tables reveals some striking results. First, it is evident that
higher DA is observed for equities than for bonds and other investments: global
average values of DA are A¯s = 2.28 (0.31), A¯oi = 1.93 (0.24) and
A¯b = 1.64 (0.17), where the subscript s, oi, and b represent stocks, bonds, and
other investment respectively, and the numbers in the brackets represent
standard errors. This is consistent with the results in Proposition 1 where DA is
shown to increase with the expected excess return. The huge gap between the
average DAs on stocks and bonds (2.28 vs. 1.64) helps to understand the
potential sources of the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). That
is, the fear of being disappointed makes investors require higher returns for
stocks than for bonds, and thus the equity premium can be explained by higher
disappointment aversion.
By dividing 35 countries into three sub-groups depending on Hofstede’s
Individualism Index, Table 3.5 also provides a preliminary view of how
individualism is associated with DA. It appears that countries in the
Individualism group tend to exhibit higher DAs than those in the Median and
Collectivism groups regardless of any asset type. In the following sections, we
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formally investigate the relationship between DA and individualism.
Abnormal levels of DA (A < 1 or A > 4) that contradict the theoretical instinct
may appear in all asset classes. In particular, due to rapid growth or monetary
policies, extreme low levels of DA are more frequent in emerging markets as a
result of high levels of risk–free rates. On the other hand, some of the developed
markets exhibit enormous DA, such as Denmark, Sweden and Hong Kong. These
countries are somehow much less risk–averse according to the unav index, Note
that our propositions suggest a negative relationship between risk aversion and
disappointment aversion (see also the results in the robustness test).
Abnormal DAs that contradict the theoretical instinct appear in all asset
classes. For example, extremely low DA are more frequent to emerging markets
as a result of high risk–free rates due to rapid growth or monetary policies. On
the other hand, some of the developed markets exhibit large DAs such as
Denmark, Sweden and Hong Kong. These countries are somehow much less
risk–averse according to the unav index. This suggests a negative relationship
between risk aversion and disappointment aversion (see also the results in the
robustness test). Moreover, in some countries associated with negative premiums
(µi − rf < 0), investors have to be disappointment–seeking so that the observed
proportions of asset can be held. In this way, the estimates may fall below the
minimal level of DA. (i.e., 1 > A− > A).
[Insert TABLE 3.5 about here]
3.3.4 Individualism vs. Disappointment Aversion
To further investigate the relationship between individualism and DA, we
conduct the following panel regression using asset allocation data from
2005–2012:
Ln(Ak) = β0 + β1CGDPk,t + β2DGDPk,t + β3EFEk,t + β4GDPk,t/1000 +
β5INDVk + β6MCAPk,t/1000 + β7MGDPk,t + β8PSIk,t + β9V EXk + εk,t,
the dependent variable is the DA of country k, which is calculated using annual
returns. The log values of Ak,t are used to minimise the effects of outliers in DA.
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Most independent variables are time–varying except for the level of individualism,
(Individualism Index, INDV) and stability of the aggregate economy (volatility of
foreign exchange rate over the sample period, VEX). As in the studies of cross-
country analysis, e.g., Chui et al. (2010), these are the scale of financial resources
(credit to private sector, as the % of GDP, CGDP); government’s debt solvency or
the aggressiveness of the governments’ financial policy (based on the debt to GDP
ratio, DGDP);economic openness (overall economic freedom index published by the
heritage foundation, EFE); aggregate wealth level (GDP in trillions, scaled down
by dividing 1,000); size of stock market (market capitalization in trillions, MCAP),
relative size of stock capitalization (ratio of market capitalization to GDP, MGDP,
scaled down by dividing 1,000); and political stability (issued by the World Bank
to reflect perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, PSI).
Table 3.6 reports the results25. First of all, we find strong evidence to support
our hypothesis that DA increases with individualism for all asset classes. The
coefficients of INDV are all significantly greater than zero at the 5% significance
level. In addition to individualism, DA also increases in countries with more
developed financial markets, i.e., greater credit scale (CGDP) or higher market
openness (EFE).
Second, DA of equities appears to increase for wealthier nations (higher
GDP). Since the rich are less risk–averse, this result indicates that risk aversion
has negative relationship with DA, confirming our earlier result in Propositions 2.
Interestingly, the effects of GDP on DA of bonds and other investments are
negative. One explanation behind this opposite relationship is that when
investment proportions in equities change, those in the other asset classes are
affected in the opposite way and so does the relationship between DA of bonds
and other investments and GDP.
Some other variables are quite mixed. For example, higher political risk (lower
PSI) leads to stronger DA in equities. Conversely, this relationship is reversed
25Results in Iceland and Pakistan (only for other investmetns) are excluded from the regressions
because of the negative DA.
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in other investments. Moreover, PSI and MGDP do not affect DA in bonds. In
addition, we find that DGDP is not relevant in explaining DA in bonds and other
investments as well.
[Insert TABLE 3.6 about here]
3.3.5 Robustness Tests
Our results may be affected by the risk related parameters (ϕ, v) or the
subjective weighting parameter, which we use from previous studies such as
Hofstede (2001) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999). We test if our results are robust
to different risk related parameters and various subjective weighting parameters.
Three different levels of ϕ are tested by setting Cϕ=25, 50 and 100. When
Cϕ=25, the risk–return relationship parameter ϕ ranges from 0.92 to 4.48 for
the 35 sampled countries while it drops down to the range from 0.2 to 1.1 when
Cϕ=100. Therefore, a smaller Cϕ indicates that risk is more highly priced than a
large Cϕ suggests. Similarly, by setting Cv=1, 10, and 20 we can test the impact
of different curvature parameters on the estimates of DA. A small value of Cv
suggests that investors are nearly risk-neutral, i.e., v is close to one, whereas a
large value of Cv increases the level of curvature for gains and losses. In addition
to the above risk parameters, we also investigate the effects of subjective
weighting parameter δ on the estimates of DA by changing the value of δ from
0.5 to 1. When δ=1, there is no subjective distortion in probability whereas a
small value of δ indicates a significant bias in the probability density function.
A total number of nine cases by combining Cϕ and Cv are reported in Table
3.7 for equities, bonds and others. As expected by Propositions 2 and 3,
disappointment aversion for equities increases as ϕ decreases (Cϕ increases).
When investors are less risk–averse, they become more disappointment–averse.
The results are in line with what we have found in this study: as wealth
increases, investors become less risk–averse (because of the decreasing absolute
risk aversion), but their disappointment aversion increases.
Our analytical results, however, do not clearly dictate the relationship
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between the curvature parameter v and disappointment aversion because of their
non–linear relationship. The empirical results in Panels A.1, B.1 and C.1 of Table
3.7 show that when curvature increases, disappointment aversion also increases.
Therefore, when investors are less risk–averse (i.e., both Cϕ and Cv are large),
they become disappointment–averse.
We conduct a series of regressions for different values of Cϕ and Cv to review
whether the positive relationship between DA and individualism holds. Selected
results are reported in Panels A.2, B.2 and C.2 of Table VI for equities, bonds, and
others, respectively. In most cases the coefficient of individualism is significantly
greater than zero at the 5% level in most cases.
[Insert TABLE 3.7 about here]
The estimates of disappointment aversion with respect to the different values
of subjective probability weighting parameter are reported in Table 3.8. In
general when subjective weighting becomes severe, i.e., δ decreases,
disappointment aversion increases. When extreme events are eventually
overweighted, the fear from disaster-like outcomes increases, and so does
disappointment aversion. The variation of statistical significance between DA and
individualism is, in fact, similar to the variation from different (Cϕ, Cv). In
general, a positive relationship between DA and individualism is supported quite
well for all values of δ from 0.5 to 1. However, the robustness of such
relationships is sensitive to asset types. For example, in the case of equities, we
observe that the effect of individualism becomes more pronounced with the
increase in probability distortion. On the contrary, in the case of bonds,
individualism tends to be more influential on DA for less probability weighting (δ
closes to 1). Finally, the situation for other investments sits in the middle, where
the most effective area to enhance the connection between DA and individualism
is concentrated around δ=0.7.
[Insert TABLE 3.8 about here]
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Using an asset allocation problem, we investigate how optimal investment
proportions are affected by disappointment aversion as well as risk aversion. As
in Koszegi and Rabin (2007) and Barberis (2013), utility in this study is a
combination of wealth (consumption) utility that has been widely used in the
conventional economics and finance and DA utility that depends on gains and
losses calculated with respect to the expected wealth. Under the assumption that
DA utility is additively separable, we demonstrate how the optimal investment
proportions are affected by disappointment aversion, risk aversion, and expected
excess returns. DA has a negative relationship with risk aversion. It is well
known that risk aversion decreases as wealth increases. What we find in this
study is that when wealth increases, risk aversion decreases but DA increases.
We also show that DA increases with individualism, suggesting that
overconfident investors would suffer more disutility when outcome falls below
the expectation. As investors become less risk–averse and more confident as
wealth increases, they tend to avoid disappointment more. This means that they
require a higher premium for an asset to compensate disappointment if losses
from this asset are high. The fact that highly individualistic cultures are
demonstrating stronger DA is also interesting from a behavioural perspective, as
it indicates that DA might help reduce overconfidence; if investors feel
overconfident and suddenly become disappointed, such cognitive dissonance
may force investors to cool down and re-evaluate their situation.
It is worth pointing out here that the sample composition only involves asset
allocations from a very specific type of investors: professional pension fund
managers. As research, in particular, among emerging markets has shown, the
managers of pension funds are subject to strict regulatory regimes in terms of
their asset selection and allocation; considering the fact that cultural factors
(such as individualism and uncertainty avoidance) play an important role in
pension funds’ supervision and regulation Lecq et al. (2013), our study aims at
empirically investigating whether the interaction of culture with DA allows us to
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better understand asset allocation decisions of pension funds at the aggregate
level in each country.
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Table 3.1
Asset Allocations of Pension Funds
Data in Table 3.1 comprises the asset allocations of pension funds in 35 markets
which are derived from the OECD database. To save space, only arithmetic means
are reported from the sampling period 2005–2012. The “Other Investments”
category includes loans, land and buildings, unallocated insurance contracts,
hedge funds, private equity funds, structured products and other mutual funds.
in % Equities Bonds Cash & Deposits Other Investments
Australia 25.17 9.47 10.71 54.64
Austria 30.53 50.83 9.06 9.58
Belgium 21.68 25.62 4.88 47.82
Brazil 16.50 22.37 0.05 61.08
Canada 29.85 30.90 3.40 35.85
Chile 26.07 48.23 0.35 25.35
Czech Republic 3.66 80.95 8.35 7.04
Denmark 19.69 60.61 0.55 19.15
Finland 41.10 39.54 1.50 17.87
France 34.68 47.39 7.63 10.30
Germany 11.24 35.74 2.86 50.16
Greece 4.38 50.40 39.72 5.50
HongKong 51.28 26.83 13.77 8.13
Hungary 9.32 64.09 2.51 24.07
Iceland 24.57 51.36 6.02 18.06
Israel 5.10 81.45 4.74 8.71
Italy 11.24 43.07 5.93 39.76
Japan 12.65 40.06 5.85 41.44
Korea 0.80 39.23 34.78 25.19
Luxembourg 0.64 33.27 9.98 56.11
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Table 3.1 (continued)
in % Equities Bonds Cash & Deposits Other Investments
Mexico 14.79 82.47 0.29 2.45
Netherlands 34.54 39.87 3.16 22.42
Norway 28.59 57.28 3.60 10.53
Pakistan 27.55 43.77 26.21 2.46
Poland 31.75 63.18 4.08 0.99
Portugal 21.44 44.97 9.44 24.16
Slovenia 3.36 62.87 19.99 13.78
South Africa 21.26 6.78 5.80 66.15
Spain 13.84 58.82 13.52 13.81
Sweden 22.32 59.15 2.65 15.87
Switzerland 15.59 25.71 7.80 50.90
Thailand 11.42 72.13 12.95 3.50
Turkey 14.19 58.22 12.26 15.33
UK 35.32 24.42 2.78 37.48
US 45.99 21.37 1.30 31.33
Note: (1) Asset allocations for the year 2005 and 2012 in Brazil are not
available, the sampling period for Brazil is reduced to 2006–2011.
(2) Since OECD does not have any records for France, mean asset allocations for
France are replaced by another similar indicator: “Asset Allocations of
Institutional Investors’ assets”; the sampling period covers from 2008 to 2012.
(3) Asset allocations are not available in Greece for the years 2005 and 2006,
data for these two years refers to “Asset Allocations of Institutional Investors’
assets”.
(4) Asset allocations are not available in Japan for the year 2005 and 2006, data
for these two years refer to “Asset Allocations of Institutional Investors’ assets”.
(5) Asset allocations for the years 2005 and 2006 are not available. Therefore
the sampling period for Pakistan is reduced to 2007–2012.
(6) Asset allocations for the year 2012 are not available. Therefore the sampling
period for South Africa is reduced to 2005–2011.
(7) Asset allocations are not available in Turkey for the year 2007; another GPS
indicator “Personal Pension Fund Assets” is applied as a replacement.
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Table 3.2
Summary Statistics of Asset Returns
Equity returns are measured by the composite index of the major stock exchange
in each country. Monthly price levels are obtained via DataStream and then
converted into log–return. Bond returns are calculated with equal weight on the
total returns of government and corporate bonds. Returns of other investments
consist of four major assets on equal weights: real estates (MSCI World Real
Estate), infrastructure (Dow Jones Brookfield GLB INFRA), hedge funds (S&P
Listed Private Equity) and private equities (HFRI Fund of Funds Composite).
Finally, risk–free rates are proxied by 30–day T–bill rates. If T–bill returns are not
available, 30–day interbank rates or repo–rates are applied instead. The “S.D.”
column next to every asset type refers to the returns standard deviation.
in % Equity S.D. Bond S.D. Others S.D. Risk–Free
Australia 8.58 14.99 5.02 6.79 11.66 28.71 5.15
Austria 8.09 23.23 5.50 3.45 8.83 24.42 2.64
Belgium 8.53 19.30 5.67 3.86 8.83 24.42 2.64
Brazil 18.16 21.17 7.22 4.71 5.43 24.6 13.36
Canada 9.05 16.04 6.96 4.16 10.68 24.65 2.42
Chile 15.21 14.73 6.39 2.49 10.60 26.15 0.31
Czech Republic 15.61 20.16 12.98 13.28 11.52 26.8 2.19
Denmark 10.68 19.01 6.27 4.03 8.81 24.31 2.98
Finland 3.45 23.49 5.46 3.44 8.83 24.42 2.64
France 6.67 17.70 5.35 3.56 8.83 24.42 2.64
Germany 9.22 18.98 5.45 3.56 8.83 24.42 2.64
Greece -4.02 30.28 2.94 14.5 8.83 24.42 2.64
Hong Kong 12.75 22.55 4.42 2.10 7.71 16.87 2.00
Hungary 7.30 24.72 8.09 8.03 7.79 29.66 7.67
Iceland -7.21 47.70 5.03 2.15 1.77 27.94 9.66
Israel 9.50 17.79 6.14 2.96 9.65 22.54 4.53
Italy 2.25 19.32 5.05 4.00 8.83 24.42 2.64
Japan 2.01 18.49 4.62 2.83 10.32 18.26 0.16
Korea 13.20 21.67 6.89 2.32 8.97 27.35 3.65
Luxembourg 12.61 14.00 3.030 3.67 8.83 24.42 2.64
Mexico 21.12 17.07 7.99 4.67 6.18 25.73 6.95
Netherlands 4.51 20.75 5.62 3.61 8.83 24.42 2.64
Norway 13.53 24.07 6.21 3.62 9.95 25.80 3.98
Pakistan 17.42 28.92 9.58 5.09 1.82 18.64 7.46
Poland 10.22 22.96 7.75 5.56 10.32 30.40 6.07
Portugal 4.08 18.09 4.97 7.46 8.83 24.42 2.64
Slovenia -0.10 19.72 4.01 2.33 8.83 24.42 2.64
South Africa 16.77 17.17 9.56 5.95 4.62 30.09 8.22
Spain 6.82 19.42 4.54 4.35 8.83 24.42 2.64
Sweden 11.93 18.76 6.00 3.86 9.35 27.06 2.50
Switzerland 6.87 14.14 5.49 3.37 11.55 23.35 1.05
Thailand 17.55 25.65 6.12 4.65 10.60 20.50 2.59
Turkey 20.20 31.28 10.21 5.28 5.47 27.91 12.73
UK 8.36 15.47 7.06 4.29 7.04 23.27 3.78
US 7.36 17.54 6.52 6.39 7.69 16.81 2.40
Global Average 9.38 21.04 6.29 4.75 8.44 24.58 4.10
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Table 3.3
Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index around the World
Table 3.3 lists the Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index (unav) for 35 countries
around the world. Columns on the right refer to the applicable risk aversion
parameters ϕ and v.
unav ϕ v
Australia 51 1.02 1.20
Austria 70 1.40 1.14
Belgium 94 1.88 1.11
Brazil 76 1.52 1.13
Canada 48 0.96 1.21
Chile 86 1.72 1.12
Czech Republic 74 1.48 1.14
Denmark 23 0.46 1.43
Finland 59 1.18 1.17
France 86 1.72 1.12
Germany 65 1.30 1.15
Greece 112 2.24 1.09
HongKong 29 0.58 1.34
Hungary 82 1.64 1.12
Iceland 50 1.00 1.20
Israel 81 1.62 1.12
Italy 75 1.50 1.13
Japan 92 1.84 1.11
Korea 85 1.70 1.12
Luxembourg 70 1.40 1.14
Mexico 82 1.64 1.12
Netherlands 53 1.06 1.19
Norway 50 1.00 1.20
Pakistan 70 1.40 1.14
Poland 93 1.86 1.11
Portugal 104 2.08 1.10
Slovenia 88 1.76 1.11
South Africa 49 0.98 1.20
Spain 86 1.72 1.12
Sweden 29 0.58 1.34
Switzerland 58 1.16 1.17
Thailand 64 1.28 1.16
Turkey 85 1.70 1.12
UK 35 0.70 1.29
US 46 0.92 1.22
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Table 3.4
Hofstede’s Individualism Index around the World
Table 3.4 lists the Hofstede’s individualism index for 35 countries around the
world. The individualism index is the degree to which individuals are integrated
into groups. On the individualist side (higher scores), people are supposed to fit a
society where individual opinions are emphasized; on the collectivist side (lower
scores), everyone is expected to act as part of a team and look after one another.
Collectivism Median Individualism
Country Indv Country Indv Country Indv
Pakistan 14 Japan 46 Germany 67
Korea 18 Spain 51 Switzerland 68
Thailand 20 Israel 54 Norway 69
Chile 23 Austria 55 France 71
Hong Kong 25 Hungary 55 Sweden 71
Portugal 27 Czech Republic 58 Denmark 74
Slovenia 27 Iceland 60 Belgium 75
Mexico 30 Luxembourg 60 Italy 76
Greece 35 Poland 60 Canada 80
Turkey 37 Finland 63 Netherlands 80
Brazil 38 South Africa 65 UK 89
Australia 90
US 91
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Table 3.5
Disappointment Aversion over Different Assets
Table 3.5 contains the average DA (standard error) and the minimal level of
DA (standard error) for each country with respect to equities, bonds and other
investment, respectively.
Equity
Collectivism Group A standard error A− standard error
Panel A.1
Brazil 1.6423 0.0288 1.5171 0.0223
Chile 2.6680 0.0167 2.4584 0.0147
Greece 0.3999 0.0272 0.5843 0.0208
Hong Kong 5.4644 0.0890 4.4995 0.0744
Korea 2.5143 0.0353 1.8748 0.0198
Mexico 2.7867 0.0224 2.4070 0.0178
Pakistan 2.3137 0.0389 2.0776 0.0311
Portugal 1.1438 0.0160 1.1359 0.0136
Slovenia 0.6128 0.0256 0.7516 0.0173
Thailand 3.6115 0.0441 2.8180 0.0320
Turkey 1.8433 0.0336 1.6697 0.0283
Group Average 2.2728 0.0343 1.9813 0.0266
Panel A.2
Median Group A standard error A- standard error
Austria 1.7949 0.0322 1.6275 0.0267
Czech Republic 3.2595 0.0351 2.4387 0.0227
Finland 1.1360 0.0393 1.0972 0.0318
Hungary 0.9650 0.0314 1.0005 0.0239
Iceland -2.1624 0.0895 -1.3589 0.0642
Israel 1.7406 0.0249 1.5113 0.0181
Japan 1.1716 0.0205 1.1702 0.0159
Luxembourg 3.5760 0.0347 2.2352 0.0173
Poland 1.3782 0.0212 1.3500 0.0190
South Africa 3.1152 0.0424 2.5834 0.0315
Spain 1.5130 0.0225 1.3617 0.0182
Group Average 1.5898 0.0358 1.3652 0.0263
Panel A.3
Individualism Group A standard error A- standard error
Australia 1.8248 0.0356 1.5931 0.0254
Belgium 1.5922 0.0199 1.5039 0.0166
Canada 2.6231 0.0380 2.2290 0.0311
Denmark 8.7294 0.1879 4.9091 0.0936
France 1.4491 0.0184 1.3867 0.0168
Germany 2.1735 0.0348 1.8120 0.0245
Italy 0.9088 0.0275 0.9474 0.0208
Netherlands 1.4505 0.0397 1.2997 0.0313
Norway 3.0511 0.0512 2.5658 0.0410
Sweden 6.4639 0.1103 4.2880 0.0628
Switzerland 2.2135 0.0298 1.9073 0.0221
UK 2.7614 0.0594 2.2857 0.0424
US 2.1161 0.0398 2.0160 0.0337
Group Average 2.8736 0.0533 2.2110 0.0355
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Table 3.5 (continued)
Disappointment Aversion with respect to Bond, Panel B
Bond
Collectivism Group A standard error A− standard error
Panel B.1
Brazil 0.0364 0.0067 0.2088 0.0055
Chile 1.7876 0.0048 1.7234 0.0045
Greece 1.0369 0.0107 1.0347 0.0101
Hong Kong 3.7967 0.0292 2.7767 0.0185
Korea 1.4314 0.0049 1.3864 0.0044
Mexico 1.1276 0.0058 1.1246 0.0057
Pakistan 1.3458 0.0094 1.3071 0.0084
Portugal 1.2063 0.0069 1.1911 0.0064
Slovenia 1.1670 0.0037 1.1585 0.0035
Thailand 1.6167 0.0084 1.5860 0.0080
Turkey 0.7092 0.0071 0.7272 0.0066
Group Average 1.3874 0.0089 1.2931 0.0074
Panel B.2
Austria 1.4755 0.0055 1.4317 0.0050
Czech Republic 2.2852 0.0166 2.2490 0.0161
Finland 1.6228 0.0097 1.5317 0.0086
Hungary 1.0561 0.0093 1.0531 0.0088
Iceland -0.4215 0.0080 -0.2441 0.0070
Israel 1.2018 0.0040 1.1968 0.0039
Japan 1.5244 0.0041 1.4747 0.0038
Luxembourg 1.0696 0.0081 1.0595 0.0069
Poland 1.1770 0.0057 1.1685 0.0054
South Africa 1.5849 0.0217 1.3377 0.0125
Spain 1.2259 0.0051 1.2124 0.0048
Group Average 1.2547 0.0089 1.2246 0.0075
Panel B.3
Australia 0.9969 0.0229 0.9980 0.0144
Belgium 1.3580 0.0045 1.3097 0.0039
Canada 2.4458 0.0135 2.1320 0.0106
Denmark 4.7817 0.0549 4.0418 0.0442
France 1.3348 0.0043 1.3069 0.0039
Germany 1.5415 0.0068 1.4623 0.0058
Italy 1.3705 0.0059 1.3311 0.0052
Netherlands 1.7895 0.0095 1.6637 0.0079
Norway 1.5912 0.0120 1.5288 0.0107
Sweden 3.5418 0.0330 3.1209 0.0275
Switzerland 2.1141 0.0104 1.8815 0.0082
UK 3.0668 0.0285 2.3816 0.0191
US 2.3795 0.0214 1.9864 0.0153
Group Average 2.1778 0.0175 1.9342 0.0136
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Table 3.5 (continued)
Disappointment Aversion with respect to Other Investments, Panel C
Other Investment
Collectivism Group A standard error A− standard error
Panel C.1
Brazil 0.0992 0.0275 0.2098 0.0270
Chile 2.0497 0.0289 1.9330 0.0247
Greece 1.5695 0.0231 1.4330 0.0174
Hong Kong 5.3425 0.1549 3.1229 0.0645
Korea 1.5474 0.0300 1.4553 0.0247
Mexico 0.6489 0.0408 0.9598 0.0249
Pakistan -0.0851 0.0381 0.3350 0.0228
Portugal 1.5258 0.0216 1.4306 0.0190
Slovenia 1.6565 0.0287 1.5732 0.0222
Thailand 2.6542 0.0482 2.0447 0.0291
Turkey 0.1876 0.0328 0.3038 0.0267
Group Average 1.5633 0.0431 1.3455 0.0276
Panel C.2
Austria 1.9277 0.0421 1.7277 0.0301
Czech Republic 2.4116 0.0422 1.9887 0.0297
Finland 2.0964 0.0467 1.8721 0.0347
Hungary 0.9112 0.0341 1.0199 0.0288
Iceland -0.7834 0.0632 -0.2444 0.0475
Israel 1.5806 0.0313 1.5090 0.0228
Japan 1.9954 0.0179 1.8596 0.0168
Luxembourg 1.7948 0.0315 1.7461 0.0294
Poland 1.4310 0.0426 1.3384 0.0257
South Africa 0.3548 0.0530 0.4597 0.0499
Spain 1.6900 0.0298 1.5512 0.0236
Group Average 1.4009 0.0395 1.3480 0.0308
Panel C.3
Australia 2.1420 0.0555 2.0642 0.0482
Belgium 1.5631 0.0228 1.5069 0.0215
Canada 2.8329 0.0549 2.5147 0.0436
Denmark 6.3452 0.2225 3.5604 0.1084
France 1.7035 0.0304 1.5705 0.0232
Germany 1.8379 0.0345 1.8192 0.0312
Italy 1.7117 0.0303 1.6330 0.0277
Netherlands 2.2426 0.0528 1.9645 0.0401
Norway 2.4610 0.0693 1.9807 0.0459
Sweden 4.9511 0.1655 3.1676 0.0863
Switzerland 2.6512 0.0404 2.5312 0.0343
UK 2.1023 0.0828 1.9159 0.0602
US 2.2526 0.0455 2.0513 0.0355
Group Average 2.6767 0.0698 2.1754 0.0466
78 3.5 Tables & Figures of This Chapter
Table 3.6
Regression Results
The next few tables report the regression results corresponding to equities, bonds
and other investments. We have to exclude countries that exhibit negative DA,
which will cause problems when taking the natural logarithm. The dependent
variables DA are average values of 1,000 DA computed from the bootstrapping
method. Therefore, DA is not time–varying. Finally, risk parameters are set as
Cϕ = 50, Cv = 10 while the probability weighting parameter δ = 0.74.
Panel A Equities
Adj R-squared: 0.37892 (0.02658)
Variable mean of the coef. standard error
Intercept -1.04235 0.04497
CGDP 0.00141 0.00011
DGDP -0.00322 0.00011
EFE 0.01623 0.0005
GDP 0.06614 0.01249
INDV 0.00236 0.00014
MCAP -0.0748 0.00831
MGDP 0.05391 0.00925
PSI -0.08432 0.00378
VEX 0.15008 0.01918
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Table 3.6 (continued)
Panel B Bonds
Adj R-squared: 0.20960 (0.02343 )
Variable mean of the Coef, standard error
Intercept -1.28117 0.12284
CGDP 0.00163 0.00017
DGDP 0.0007 0.00022
EFE 0.01809 0.00168
GDP -0.11411 0.01307
INDV 0.0026 0.00021
MCAP 0.07702 0.01271
MGDP -0.05288 0.00546
PSI -0.01067 0.00891
VEX -0.13111 0.00763
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Table 3.6 (continued)
Panel C Other Investments
Adj R-squared: 0.61400 (0.01130 )
Variable mean of the coef standard error
Intercept -0.55181 0.0897
CGDP 0.0015 0.00013
DGDP -0.0002 0.00014
EFE 0.01383 0.00132
GDP -0.05358 0.01113
INDV 0.00163 0.00011
MCAP 0.02435 0.00945
MGDP -0.09322 0.00993
PSI 0.08024 0.00713
VEX -0.58568 0.00590
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Table 3.7
Disappointment Aversion under Different Risk–Related Parameters
A wide range of risk–related parameters is used to examine the robustness
between DA and individualism. Panels A.1, B.1 and C.1 list the global average DA
for equities, bonds and other investments, respectively. For the robustness test,
DA values are time–varying as they are calculated using asset allocation data in
each year from 2005-2012. In order to avoid inconsistencies with former sections,
the mean and standard deviation of asset returns are assumed to be constant over
the sampling period of 2003–2012. Panels A.2, B.2 and C.2 report the results of
the panel regression.
Panel A.1
Cϕ Cv = 1 Cv = 10 Cv = 20
Cϕ = 25 1.3666 1.6745 2.5764
Cϕ = 50 1.7332 2.3491 4.1527
Cϕ = 100 2.4664 3.6981 7.3054
Panel A.2
(Cϕ, Cv = 1) Coef. t–stat p–value
(25,1) 0.0011 1.7156 0.0877
(25,10) 0.0021 1.9461 0.0534
(25,20) 0.0037 2.0142 0.0453
(50,1) 0.0024 2.3774 0.0186
(50,10) 0.0043 2.7277 0.0069
(50,20) 0.0078 3.1007 0.0021
(100,1) 0.0063 3.3716 0.0009
(100,10) 0.0069 3.0655 0.0025
(100,20) 0.0060 0.2112 0.8342
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Panel B.1
Cϕ Cv = 1 Cv = 10 Cv = 20
Cϕ 1.1516 1.3177 1.8706
Cϕ = 25 1.3032 1.6354 2.7412
Cϕ = 50 1.6064 2.2707 4.4823
Panel B.2
(Cϕ, Cv = 1) Coef. t–stat p–value
(25,1) 0.0016 2.9617 0.0034
(25,10) 0.0036 3.1547 0.0018
(25,20) 0.0055 3.6105 0.0004
(50,1) 0.0032 2.6712 0.0081
(50,10) 0.0060 2.8007 0.0055
(50,20) 0.0060 3.3464 0.001
(100,1) 0.0023 2.2697 0.0244
(100,10) 0.0045 2.9573 0.0035
(100,20) 0.0078 3.1739 0.0017
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Panel C.1
Cϕ Cv = 1 Cv = 10 Cv = 20
Cϕ 1.2844 1.4849 2.0519
Cϕ = 25 1.5688 1.9798 3.1039
Cϕ = 50 2.1376 2.9596 5.2077
Panel C.2
(Cϕ, Cv = 1) Coef. t–stat p–value
(25,1) 0.0020 2.4112 0.0165
(25,10) 0.0033 1.8346 0.0676
(25,20) 0.0020 1.3611 0.1762
(50,1) 0.0025 2.3473 0.0198
(50,10) 0.0033 2.2362 0.0265
(50,20) 0.0030 1.6182 0.1085
(100,1) 0.0035 3.8728 0.0002
(100,10) 0.0044 3.1727 0.0017
(100,20) 0.0057 2.7419 0.0066
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Table 3.8
Robustness Tests under Different Degrees of Probability Weighting
Table 3.8 compares the results of panel regression with respect to equities, bonds
and other investments for δ from 0.5 to 1. For the robustness test, DA values
are time–varying as they are calculated using asset allocation data in each year
from 2005-2012. In order to avoid inconsistencies with former sections, the
mean and standard deviation of asset returns are assumed to be constant over
the sampling period of 2003–2012. Risk–related parameters equal default values:
Cϕ = 50, Cv = 10.
Equities
ϕ A¯e Coef. t–stat p–value
0.5 2.7423 0.006 3.1741 0.0017
0.6 2.5282 0.005 2.9361 0.0037
0.7 2.3900 0.0044 2.7768 0.006
0.8 2.2992 0.0041 2.6706 0.0081
0.9 2.2395 0.0039 2.6170 0.0098
1.0 2.2009 0.0038 2.5676 0.011
Bonds
ϕ A¯b Coef. t–stat p–value
0.5 1.8193 0.0037 3.0582 0.0025
0.6 1.7191 0.0035 3.0908 0.0022
0.7 1.6545 0.0065 2.5229 0.0122
0.8 1.6122 0.0053 3.0511 0.0026
0.9 1.5845 0.0048 3.2116 0.0015
1.0 1.5667 0.0046 3.2983 0.0011
Other Investments
ϕ A¯or Coef. t–stat p–value
0.5 2.2647 0.002 1.3678 0.175
0.6 2.1095 0.0059 2.1721 0.0309
0.7 2.0094 0.0036 2.2517 0.0252
0.8 1.9437 0.0032 2.0194 0.045
0.9 1.9007 0.003 1.8732 0.0624
1.0 1.8729 0.0035 1.9483 0.0535
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Figure 3.1
Total assets by type of institutional investors in the OECD, 1995-2012
Fgure 3.1 shows total assets of institutional investors in the OECD (in trillions),
including investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds and other
entities. Institutional investors totalled USD 78.2 trillion in 2012, with USD
30.0 trillion coming from investment funds, USD 24.5 trillion from insurance
companies, USD 21.8 trillion from pension funds and USD 1.9 trillion from other
investors (Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics, Global Insurance Statistics and
Institutional Investors databases).
Chapter 4
Dynamic Disappointment Aversion
in Different Odours: An
Experimental Study

88 4.1 Introduction
4.1 Introduction
People assign more weights to losses as compared to gains of equivalent
nominal values. This tendency was firstly classified as loss aversion (LA) by
Tversky and Kahneman (1979). Typically, in a trading situation, the value of a
gain needs to be about twice as large as the value of a loss to be accepted
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Subsequent to the idea of KT’s original setting,
Gul (1991) proposed a more axiomatic generation named disappointment
aversion (DA) by allowing the reference point to be endogenously determined.
DA affects a wide scale of behaviour, such as decision–making in portfolio
choices (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Fielding and Stracca, 2007; Xie et al., 2014);
willingness to participate in the futures market (Lien and Wang, 2002, 2003);
extra volatilities in risk aversion and asset prices in the long run (Routledge and
Zin, 2010; Bonomo et al., 2011) or the discouragement effect in a real effort
competition (Gill and Prowse, 2012). A disappointment–averse agent, who is
loss–averse around their reference point, has been also demonstrated in brain
imaging studies, which have shown that amygdala (De Martino et al., 2010; Sokol-
Hessner et al., 2013), ventral striatum and other brain regions (Tom et al., 2008)
that mediate extra aversions to losses.
Although DA can be viewed as an individual’s stable trait, possibly linked
with monoaminergic systems in the thalamus (Takahashi et al., 2013), aversion
to potentially unfavourable outcomes has also been shown to vary under the
influence of emotions (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001)
or cognitive–emotional appraisals applied during decision–making
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009, 2013). Information about occurrence of adverse
events has been reported to increase perceived likelihood of other adverse events
(Johnson and Tversky, 1983). These studies suggest that DA may be dynamically
adapted in response to instantaneous situational and affective influences.
The sense of smell informs us about the presence of both adverse cues such as
fire, poisons, contaminated food or water, and appetitive cues such as food,
group members or a safe, nurturing environment. Unpleasant odours have been
CHAPTER 4 89
shown to increase the aversive startle reflex (Miltner et al., 1994; Ehrlichman
et al., 1997). Detection of unpleasant odours compared to pleasant odours occurs
faster (Bensafi et al., 2002; Jacob and Wang, 2006; Boesveldt et al., 2010), and
unpleasant odours are associated with a stronger autonomic arousal than
pleasant odours (Brauchli et al., 1995; Alaoui-Ismaili et al., 1997). Odours have
also been shown to shift hedonic evaluations of previously neutral visual stimuli
towards negative or positive depending on the hedonic quality of the odour
(Todrank et al., 1995). Further, odours activate a number of regions known to
participate in decision–making including among others the orbitofrontal cortex
(Rolls et al., 1996; Gottfried and Zald, 2005), anterior cingulate cortex (Savic
and Gulyas, 2000; Ciumas et al., 2008; Rolls et al., 2010), amygdala (Zald and
Pardo, 1997; Royet et al., 2000; Savic et al., 2000; Cerf-Ducastel and Murphy,
2003; Gottfried and Dolan, 2004), and anterior insula (Heining et al., 2003;
Wicker et al., 2003; Rolls, 2005; Bensafi et al., 2007; Plailly et al., 2007).
The present study aimed to investigate the role of odours on DA in a
monetary gamble task. We hypothesised that an unpleasant odour would
increase DA relative to presentation of a pleasant or neutral odour. Low–intensity
odours were administered during presentation of two prospects, one offering an
uncertain gain and loss, and the other an assured zero or non–zero win.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Subjects
Thirty–two healthy subjects (18 females, 14 males), aged 25.7 ± 3.55 years
(mean ± standard deviation), took part in the study. All subjects showed normal
sensitivity to odours according to the Sniffin’ Stick test battery (Hummel et al.,
1997). Further, none of the subjects reported any history of a neurological or
respiratory disorder, or any acute or chronic inflammation of the respiratory
pathways. Subjects gave their written consent prior to the study. The procedures
of the experiment were approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the
University of Liverpool. Participants received £8 to compensate them for their
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travel expenses and time.
4.2.2 Procedure
Subjects sat in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated room. The air was continuously
cleaned using a Blueair 203 Heppasilent Particle Filter system (Blueair AB,
Sweden) to prevent accumulation of any odour residuals in ambient air. Subjects
viewed stimuli on a 19–inch cathode ray tube monitor and rested their right
hand on a computer mouse. Odours were delivered using a flow olfactometer
(OL2, DancerDesign, United Kingdom) at a rate of 2.2 l/min. The olfactometer
delivers constant flow of clean air or an odour using two polytetrafluoroethylene
tubes of 2 mm diameter ending about 2 cm below the nostrils. The air flowed
continuously through bottles containing either about 20 ml of propylene glycol
(1,2–Propanediol 99%, Sigma–Aldrich Co., USA), or jasmine (Jasmin Flavour
10794272/2, Symrise GmbH, Germany), or methylmercaptan (Methylmercaptan
10786168/2, Symrise GmbH, Germany) which was diluted in propylene glycol at
1% concentration. These odours, tested in a pilot experiment (N=45,
unpublished), yielded distinct pleasant (jasmine) or unpleasant (rotten egg)
sensations of comparable subjective intensities without provoking any irritation
to the nasal mucosa. To prevent droplets of solution propelling through the tubes
of the olfactometer, a cellulose foam was inserted into the bottles. Odours were
delivered in pulses of 4 s duration and in pseudo–random order such that an
identical odour could not occur twice in a row. The randomisation procedure
also maintained intervals between two presentations of the same odour long
enough (>30 s) to prevent habituation (Jehl et al., 1994).
The experiment started with acquisition of subjective ratings for pleasantness,
intensity and familiarity of each odour. Odour stimuli were presented for 4 s, and
subjects rated each odour using three visual analogue scales shown on a computer
screen. The intensity scale was anchored with labels “no odour”, and “very strong
odour”. The pleasantness scale ranged from “very unpleasant” to “very pleasant”,
and the familiarity scale from “not familiar at all” to “very familiar”. All ratings
were measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.
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4.2.3 Monetary Gamble Task
The monetary gamble task was similar to the task used in previous studies
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Tom et al., 2008). Participants received an initial
endowment of £25, and were informed that this amount of money was theirs to
gamble, and that they could either increase or decrease their initial endowment
depending on their luck during the experiment. They were also informed that 10%
of gambles would be randomly selected from all trials at the end of experiment,
and the difference between sums of wins and losses on those select trials would be
added to or subtracted from their initial endowment of £25. Participants’ earnings
ranged from £6 to £15.
The experiment consisted of 240 gambles with an alternative assured win of
zero and 60 gambles with a non–zero assured win. Eighty gambles with assured
zero win showed any combination of 8 different gains and 10 different losses
for each gain. Specifically, one risky gain denoted as gi was draw from: £1.00,
£2.00, £3.00, £3.50, £4.50, £5.00, £5.50 and £6.00; one risky loss denoted as li
is calculated by multiplying a gain value by one of 10 coefficients in the range of
0.2 to 2.0 in steps of 0.2. These coefficients yielded ten gain/loss ratios as follows:
5.0, 2.5, 1.67, 1.25, 1.0, 0.83, 0.71, 0.63, 0.56, and 0.5. All permutations (n=80)
of gains and losses were presented three times in random order, and each of three
presentations of identical gambles was associated with a different odour (240
trials). Twenty trials with a non–zero assured win were also presented three times
(60 trials), each time with a different odour. The assured win trials offered a
risky prospect (P=0.5) of winning a larger amount of money and a prospect of a
smaller assured win. The list of twenty pairs of assured wins and risky gains is
given in Table 4.1. Trials were presented in random order for each participant.
Due to the large number of trials, the experiment was split into three equal blocks
of 100 trials lasting about 22 min each. Blocks were separated by resting periods
of approximately 3 min.
[Insert TABLE 4.1 about here]
The stimuli were controlled using Cogent 2000 (UCL, London, United
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Kingdom) program running in Matlab 7.8 (Mathworks, Inc., USA) environment.
The trial structure is shown in Figures 4.1A and 4.1B. Each trial began with a
fixation cross which was displayed for a variable time interval of one or two full
respiratory cycles to allow synchronisation of the trial onset with onset of
inspiration. Next, two prospects were displayed on the computer screen for 4 s.
The left or right part of the screen showed two yellow text lines on a black
background, e.g.: “You win 3.0”, “You lose 3.0”. The other half of the screen
showed the value of an assured gain. While prospects were still displayed on the
screen, two yellow rectangles were displayed in the absence of an odour for
another 2.5 s. Participants were instructed to use this period to indicate their
decision about the prospects by pressing the left or right mouse button to
indicate which option they preferred, and they were also informed that if they
did not press any button within the 2.5 s interval, that particular trial would be
invalid. After indicating their choice using a computer mouse, the yellow
rectangle situated below the selected prospect turned to green. If participants
selected the risky gamble option (Figure 4.1B), a 2 s resting interval displaying a
black screen was inserted, and feedback in the form “You won” or “You lost” was
shown for 1 s. The feedback was followed by a 4 s resting interval before a
fixation cross appeared and the next trial began.
[Insert FIGURES 4.1A and 4.1B about here]
4.2.4 Eliciting Disappointment Aversion
In behavioural economics, prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979)
describes how choices are made among different risky alternatives with given
probabilities. This theory states that people make decisions based on the
potential value of losses and gains rather than the final wealth level, and that
people evaluate losses and gains using certain experience–based techniques.
Disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991) is a popular generation of KT’s original
setting. Instead of a pre–determined reference point in loss aversion, it captures
the fact that people form their reference point endogenously based on their prior
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expectations. In this section, we employed a parametric method to estimate the
level of DA using the utility function:
U(x) =
 x
v+ , x ≥ 0
−A(−x)v− , x < 0.
Using the standard two–piece power function as a reasonable representation of
the participants’ utility, we can illustrate three main elements of the DA utility
function. Firstly, the utility is reference dependent, where x represents the net
satisfaction from each of the 300 (100 x 3 types of odours) risky gambles.
Notably, subjects are supposed to define their elation (x > 0) and disappointment
in terms of their prior expectation with respect to a specific gamble, i.e., x equals
the realised pay–off minus the expected value of each gamble. Secondly, utility of
disappointment (x < 0) is denoted by the DA coefficient “A”, and it requires
A > 1 so that investors are disappointment–averse. Thirdly, the two curvature
parameters v+ and v− serve as the diminishing sensitivity to elation and
disappointment, respectively. At the individual level, although most of the
empirical studies have found that the utility shape is slightly concave for gains
but convex for losses (see Fennema and Van Assen, 1998; Abdellaoui, 2000;
Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009); it is also a common belief that the differences
between v+ and v− should be small at the aggregate level. This assumption was
supported by empirical estimations of median power coefficients v+ = 0.717 and
v− = 0.725 using a four–step elicitation procedure (Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt,
2007). Likewise, Hwang and Satchell (2010) confirmed that only minor effects
were brought in by varying the gap between v+ and v−. The main goal of this
analysis is to explore the variation of DA during the decision–making process,
therefore, we assuming the v+ = v− = v.
To initiate the elicitation process, we adopted the logit–function to predict the
probability that participants would accept a risky gamble. Formally, the function
can be written as:
F (p, xe, xd, xc) =
(
1 + exp
{
− µ(U(p, xe, xd)− U(xc))})−1, (4.1)
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where the probability to receive a positive pay-off is regarded as p. During the
whole procedure, p = 1 − p = 0.5 was maintained to ensure that there was no
subjective distortion of the probability. Denote x > 0 as xe and x < 0 as xd,
which is the expected elation or disappointment in terms of the expected value
of a gamble (Bell, 1985), i.e., for a gamble i, xe,i = gi − [pgi + (1 − p)li] or
xd,i = li − [pgi + (1 − p)li]. Then, xc represents the gains for an assured win.
Recall that xc is only presented when there is no chance to lose, otherwise it is
constrained to zero for most cases.
We further posit that participants combine their utility and probability in a
linear manner, which implies pU(x) = U(px). The logit parameter µ denotes the
sensitivity to utility deviations. µ = 0 indicates that the subject does not care
about what they have been offered at all, making their choices completely
random. On the other hand, an increasing µ suggests a greater reliance on
rationality; participants tend to make choices based on some rules or
calculations. At the extreme, all randomness will be eliminated when µ reaches
infinity, which represents the utmost consistency in preferences over choices.
Three hundred choices were collected for each participant. Choice data was
clustered based on odour type resulting in three sets, counting 100 choices each.
Denote Zi as the response related to the gamble i; Zi equals 1 if the subject
proceeds with the risky gamble, otherwise Zi will remain zero. The log likelihood
function for each odour condition is given by:
100∑
i=1
Zi log
(
F (p, xe, xd, xc)
)
+ (1− Zi) log
(
1− F (p, xe, xd, xc)
)
. (4.2)
The optimisation process involves finding a proper set of parameter values to
maximize Eq. (4.2), which includes the disappointment aversion “A”, risk
aversion v, and the logit sensitivity µ. Since estimations of these parameters
represent a non–linear fitting problem, a numerical approximation has been
chosen as a reasonable solution. Specifically, the optimal values for the above
parameters were handled using the Nelder–Mead simplex algorithm (see
Nocedal and Wright, 2006), implemented in Mathematica 9.0 (Wolfram
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Research, Inc., USA).
4.3 Results
The levels of DA, risk aversion v, and logit sensitivity µ from 32 subjects
(numbered from OLA05–OLA036) are listed in Table 4.2. Due to erratic choices
and unusually high/low values of DA (A > 5 and A < 0.5), two subjects (OLA012
and OLA018) were assessed statistically as outliers and removed from the
sample. Thus, the final sample consist of 30 participants (16 females, 14 males)
who are evaluated using one–way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated
measures with the three odour conditions as the within–subject factor. The
degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse–Geisser ε correction to
overcome any violation of the sphericity assumption.
[Insert TABLE 4.2 about here]
4.3.1 Odour Ratings
Odours differed significantly in their pleasantness according to a one–way
ANOVA for repeated measures (F (2, 58) = 517.1, p < 0.001, ε = 0.951). Jasmine
(77.8 ± 1.95, mean ± standard errors) was evaluated as more pleasant than both
clean air (52.2 ± 0.9; t(29) = 12.7, p < 0.001) and methylmercaptan (13.2 ± 1.8;
t(29) = 24.8, p < 0.001), whilst methylmercaptan was evaluated as more
unpleasant than clean air (t(29) = 18.6, p < 0.001). Odours also differed in their
intensities (F (2, 58) = 440.9, p < 0.001, ε = 0.828). Both jasmine (64.6± 2.8,mean
± standard errors) and methylmercaptan (77.7 ± 1.97) were perceived as being
stronger than clean air (7.8 ± 1.7, p < 0.001), and methylmercaptan was also
perceived to be more intense than jasmine (t(29) = 6.1, p < 0.001). Odours did
not differ in their familiarity (F (2, 58) = 0.51, p = 0.60, ε = 0.828). In the
following content, for the ease of comparison, we found it would be more
convenient to refer to the methylmercaptan as “rotten egg”.
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4.3.2 Odours and Disappointment Aversion
In the average of all three odours, 4 subjects were elation–seeking (A < 1.0),
8 subjects appeared to be elation–disappointment neutral (A ∈ [1.0, 1.1]), and 18
subjects exhibited significant disappointment aversion (A > 1.1). The total
average DA was 1.23 ± 0.035 (mean ± standard errors), matching well the mean
DA in a previous study (Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt, 2007). The mean risk
aversion v, and logit sensitivity µ were 0.9466 ± 0.22 and 3.97 ± 2.53. A
one–sample t–test was run to confirm the presence of DA (A > 1) with a
statistically significant difference 0.23 from 1 (95% CI, 0.16 to 0.30), t(89) =
6.62, p < 0.0005. Specifically, as reported in Table 4.3, DA is captured among all
three odours, and the mean ± standard errors of DA for clean air, jasmine and
rotten egg are 1.082± 0.035, 1.223± 0.049 and 1.391± 0.078, respectively.
[Insert TABLE 4.3 about here]
A one–way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether
there was a statistically significant difference in DA over three different odours.
Since estimates of A tend to be positively skewed, the natural logarithm of A
values are used to mitigate this defect. Although the assumption of sphericity
was met (Mauchly’s test of sphericity, χ2(2) = 2.867, p = 0.238. Epsilon (ε) was
0.911), due to a relatively small sample size, the assumption of sphericity is
considered difficult not to violate (Weinfurt, 2000). Maxwell and Delaney (2004)
recommend interpreting the result using a Greenhouse–Geisser correction
(Greenhouse and Geisser, 1959) to report the one–way repeated measures
ANOVA (see Table 4.4). Clearly, the variation in odours elicited statistically
significant changes in the degree of DA, as demonstrated by
F (1.823, 52.856) = 14.389, p < 0.0005.
Table 4.5 presents the results of the Bonferroni post hoc test, which allows us
to discover which specific levels of DA differed with respect to different odours.
We can see that there was a significant difference in every pair of odours. i.e.,
(p = 0.010) for clean air and jasmine; (p = 0.000) for clean air and rotten egg and
(p = 0.042) for jasmine and rotten egg.
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On the other hand, neither risk aversion nor logit sensitivity were significantly
affected by the type of odour (p > 0.1).
[Insert TABLES 4.4 and 4.5 about here]
To analyse whether the differences between jasmine and methylmercaptan in
DA would be related to variations in odour pleasantness or odour intensity,
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were computed between the differences in DA
and the difference in odour pleasantness or intensity between methylmercaptan
and jasmine conditions. The scatter plots and linear regression lines for odour
pleasantness and odour intensity are shown in Figures 4.2A and 4.2B,
respectively. We found a statistically significant correlation between the
difference values of A and odour pleasantness (r(28) = −0.364, p = 0.048)
pointing to a linear increase in A values with increased unpleasantness of
methylmercaptan over jasmine.
[Insert FIGURES 4.2A and 4.2B about here]
The correlation computed between A and odour intensity was not statistically
significant (r(28) = −0.02, p = 0.91). The association between A values and
odour pleasantness was further supported by a one–way ANCOVA for repeated
measures using A values as the dependent variable and both odour pleasantness
and intensity as covariates. The covariate effect of odour pleasantness was
statistically significant (F (1, 57) = 4.25, p = 0.044), and the main effect of odours
changed to be statistically not significant after inclusion of odour pleasantness as
a covariate (F (2, 57) = 0.88, p = 0.42). This suggests that the odour pleasantness
largely accounted for changes of A. The covariate effect of odour intensity was
not statistically significant (F (1, 57) = 0.35, p = 0.57), and the main effect of
odours proved to be statistically significant even after inclusion of the odour
intensity as a covariate (F (2, 57) = 3.40, p = 0.040).
Taken together, the data suggest an increased DA in a monetary gamble task if
prospects were displayed in the presence of an unpleasant odour, whose increase
was related to variations in hedonic evaluation of odours.
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4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Our study shows for the first time that environmental stimuli could be
another means of altering risk attitude. The variation in odours elicits
statistically significant changes in the degree of DA, F (1.597, 46.323) = 11.529,
p < 0.0005. Compared with clean air, the DA increased 0.141 ± 0.014 for the
presence of pleasant odour (jasmine), whilst the difference jumped further at
0.309 ± 0.074 in response to an unpleasant odour (rotten egg). Moreover,
odour–related individual variations in DA were associated with hedonic
evaluations of odours but not with odour intensity.
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to demonstrate
increases in DA levels during an aversive odour, emphasising evolutionarily
based, biological roots of decision–making. Furthermore, our finding highlights
the role of unpleasant odours as behavioural signals of threat or danger. Thus,
unpleasant odours alter hedonic evaluations of previously neutral stimuli toward
less pleasant (Todrank et al., 1995; van Reekum et al., 1999). Unpleasant odours
have also been shown to augment defensive reflexes (Miltner et al., 1994;
Ehrlichman et al., 1997) and to increase motor–readiness (Bensafi et al., 2002;
Jacob and Wang, 2006; Boesveldt et al., 2010), and autonomic arousal
(Alaoui-Ismaili et al., 1997; Brauchli et al., 1995). In addition, increases in DA
whilst smelling an unpleasant odour are in line with previous studies reporting
that negative emotional states increase pessimistic outlooks (Lerner and Keltner,
2001), perceived likelihood for adverse life events (Johnson and Tversky, 1983),
or perceived likelihood of occurrence of subsequent negative emotional states
(DeSteno et al., 2000).
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4.5 Tables & Figures of This Chapter
Table 4.1
List of Risky Gains and Assured Wins Used in the Experiment
The next tables lists all possible 20 risky gains (with a identical probability p = 0.5)
and 20 assured wins. Trials were presented in random order for each participant.
Due to the large number of trials, the experiment was split into three equal blocks
of 100 trials lasting about 22 min each. Blocks were separated by resting periods
of approximately 3 min.
Pair £ Risky Gain (p = 0.5) £ Assured win (p = 1.0)
1 0.5 1
2 1.5 0.5
3 2 1
4 2.5 1
5 3.5 1.5
6 4 1.5
7 6 3
8 6 2.5
9 6 2
10 7.5 2.5
11 7.5 3
12 9.5 4
13 11 5
14 11.5 5
15 12.5 4.5
16 12.5 5
17 13 5
18 13 6
19 14 7.5
20 15 6
100 4.5 Tables & Figures of This Chapter
Table 4.2
Estimations of Disappointment Aversion, Risk Aversion and Logit Sensitivity
The levels of DA (A), risk aversion v, and logit sensitivity µ from 32 subjects
(numbered from OLA05–OLA036) are listed in Table 4.2. Due to erratic choices
and unusually high/low values of DA (A > 5 and A < 0.5), two subjects (OLA012
and OLA018) were assessed statistically as outliers and removed from the sample.
Thus, the final sample consisting of 30 participants (16 females, 14 males) is
evaluated using one–way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures
with the three odour conditions as the within–subject factor.
Disappointment Aversion (A)
No. Clean Air Jasmine Rotten Egg
OLA05 1.18 1.12 1.95
OLA06 1.32 1.43 2.85
OLA07 0.92 1.04 1.16
OLA08 0.98 1.00 1.01
OLA09 0.99 1.16 1.65
OLA10 1.61 1.34 1.50
OLA11 1.15 1.15 1.08
OLA12 5.21 1.80 1.83
OLA13 1.10 1.09 1.16
OLA14 1.11 1.11 1.39
OLA15 1.00 1.47 1.94
OLA16 0.97 1.00 1.00
OLA17 1.16 1.00 1.03
OLA18 0.80 0.67 0.50
OLA19 1.45 1.07 1.66
OLA20 1.00 1.51 1.90
OLA21 1.01 1.02 1.17
OLA22 1.54 1.89 1.35
OLA23 0.86 0.95 1.09
OLA24 1.10 1.75 1.84
OLA25 1.02 1.00 1.00
OLA26 0.88 0.80 1.24
OLA27 0.87 1.13 1.00
OLA28 0.92 1.11 1.13
OLA29 1.09 1.05 1.39
OLA30 0.87 1.09 1.30
OLA31 1.28 1.78 1.22
OLA32 1.02 1.35 1.30
OLA33 1.16 1.23 1.11
OLA34 0.99 1.09 1.07
OLA35 1.00 1.66 2.05
OLA36 0.92 1.31 1.19
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Table 4.2 (continued)
Estimations of Disappointment Aversion, Risk Aversion and Logit Sensitivity
Risk Aversion v
No. Clean Air Jasmine Rotten Egg
OLA05 0.80 0.68 0.79
OLA06 0.93 1.17 0.70
OLA07 0.65 0.67 0.67
OLA08 1.33 1.32 0.97
OLA09 0.84 1.02 0.84
OLA10 1.24 0.91 1.36
OLA11 0.85 0.90 0.82
OLA12 0.32 0.95 0.89
OLA13 1.04 0.95 0.96
OLA14 0.70 1.12 0.74
OLA15 0.95 1.01 1.22
OLA16 1.12 1.50 1.35
OLA17 1.32 1.15 1.50
OLA18 0.55 0.52 0.63
OLA19 1.17 1.26 1.18
OLA20 0.93 1.20 1.25
OLA21 0.79 0.73 0.75
OLA22 0.69 1.03 0.77
OLA23 0.93 1.26 0.61
OLA24 0.70 0.94 0.80
OLA25 1.03 1.31 1.13
OLA26 0.90 0.88 1.03
OLA27 0.67 0.82 0.69
OLA28 0.70 0.64 0.71
OLA29 1.20 0.84 1.42
OLA30 0.78 0.83 0.76
OLA31 0.93 0.94 0.81
OLA32 0.80 1.14 1.09
OLA33 0.86 0.85 0.87
OLA34 0.82 0.81 0.93
OLA35 0.77 0.89 0.77
OLA36 0.76 0.92 0.78
102 4.5 Tables & Figures of This Chapter
Table 4.2 (continued)
Estimations of Disappointment Aversion, Risk Aversion and Logit Sensitivity
Logit Sensitivity µ
No. Clean Air Jasmine Rotten Egg
OLA05 4.14 5.11 6.00
OLA06 1.24 1.86 2.75
OLA07 5.28 6.09 4.66
OLA08 1.10 1.63 3.27
OLA09 2.29 1.59 1.11
OLA10 6.29 2.46 2.15
OLA11 3.14 1.67 2.80
OLA12 0.92 1.01 0.36
OLA13 2.82 2.43 3.65
OLA14 4.17 1.87 3.77
OLA15 6.06 5.49 3.18
OLA16 5.50 1.92 3.07
OLA17 1.19 3.31 1.33
OLA18 4.61 4.19 1.99
OLA19 3.41 4.09 3.16
OLA20 5.03 1.76 5.15
OLA21 4.90 8.62 6.29
OLA22 2.91 1.72 4.66
OLA23 4.98 4.28 7.38
OLA24 4.62 2.05 2.58
OLA25 1.76 1.58 2.32
OLA26 3.57 4.64 2.92
OLA27 4.96 2.08 2.83
OLA28 4.49 5.40 4.45
OLA29 2.13 1.49 2.55
OLA30 6.49 4.21 3.57
OLA31 3.21 5.27 6.97
OLA32 4.38 6.54 4.36
OLA33 4.56 8.81 9.22
OLA34 4.27 4.48 3.00
OLA35 2.88 2.68 2.09
OLA36 5.58 3.40 2.85
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Table 4.3
Means of Disappointment Aversion over Three Odours
Key Statistics of the Estimated Levels of DA for Clean Air, Jasmine and Rotten Egg.
95% Confidence Interval
Odours Mean Std Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
Clean Air 1.082 0.035 1.010 1.154
Jasmine 1.223 0.049 1.122 1.324
Rotten Egg 1.391 0.078 1.232 1.549
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Table 4.4
One–Way Repeated Measures ANOVA between Disappointment Aversion and
Different Odours
The final sample consisting of 30 participants (16 females, 14 males) are evaluated
using one–way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures with the
three odour conditions as the within–subject factor. The degrees of freedom were
corrected using the Greenhouse–Geisser correction to overcome any violation of
the sphericity assumption.
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity
Within Subjects Effect Mauchly’s W Approx. Chi–Square df Sig. ε
Odours 0.748 8.132 2 0.017 0.799
Tests of Within–Subjects Effects
Source df Mean Square F Sig.
Odours Sphericity Assumed 2.000 0.388 14.389 0.000
Greenhouse–Geisser 1.823 0.426 14.389 0.000
Huynh–Feldt 1.938 0.400 14.389 0.000
Lower–bound 1.000 0.776 14.389 0.001
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Table 4.5
Pairwise Comparisons over Three Odours
Table 4.5 reports the significance level for differences among three different
odours: clean air, jasmine and rotten egg. It allows us to discover which specific
levels of DA differ from other odour. (CA=Clean Air; JA=Jasmine; RE=Rotten
Egg).
Pairwise Comparisons over three odours
Odours Mean Difference Std Error Sigb 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
CA JA −0.115∗ 0.036 0.010 -0.206 -0.024
RE −0.227∗ 0.048 0.000 -0.348 -0.107
JA CA 0.115∗ 0.036 0.010 0.024 0.206
RE −0.112∗ 0.043 0.042 -0.222 -0.003
RE CA 0.227∗ 0.048 0.000 0.107 0.348
JA 0.112∗ 0.043 0.042 0.003 0.222
* The mean difference is significant at the 5% level.
b Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
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Figure 4.1
Flowchart of the Experiment
A. Declined gambles. Each trial started at around onset of inspiration. Two
prospects have been displayed for 4 s. One half of the screen showed a gamble
entailing 50% chance of winning or losing the displayed amount of money. The
other half of the screen showed an assured win. In the case of choosing an
assured win of 0, participants would neither lose nor win anything. In the next
2.5 s period, the prospects continued to be displayed, and two yellow rectangles
appeared at the bottom part of the screen prompting the subject to reveal their
decision by pressing the left or right button. If subjects declined to gamble and
chose the assured win, a fixation cross appeared on the computer screen and the
next trials started in few seconds depending on arrival time of the next inspiration.
B. Accepted gambles. If subjects accepted a gamble, a black screen was shown for
1 s after the 2.5 s response period elapsed, and the outcome of the last gamble
was displayed (“You won” or “You lost”) for 1 s. A resting period lasting 4 s was
inserted to allow the skin conductance response to the outcome to evolve. The
next trial started few seconds after the 4 s resting period as soon as inspiration
has been detected.
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Figure 4.2
Disappointment Aversion vs. Odour Pleasantness and Intensity
The scatter plots, linear regression lines, and 95% confidence lines representing
correlations between methylmercaptan–jasmine differences in disappointment
aversion A and odour pleasantness (A) and intensity (B).
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5.1 General Conclusion
This thesis takes a close look at the implication of disappointment aversion
(DA) in the asset allocation context. Striving to provide partial solutions to the
equity premium puzzle, we have demonstrated that how the risk exposures reduce
to account not only for risk aversion, but also for disappointment aversion. We
argue that investors are subject to this joint effect so that their risk aversion does
not have to be overstated to reconcile the observed huge equity premiums.
In Chapter 2, drawing upon the portfolio choice model of Ang et al. (2005),
we examine whether this behaviour approach could still be valid outside the US
markets. A novel algorithm of numerical approximation is developed to solve the
portfolio allocation problem that allows quantitative identification of how the
optimal weights relate to different levels of DA. For the empirical analysis, we
consider the Dimson–Marsh–Staunton (DMS) database from Morningstar, which
covers 19 countries over the period 1900–2011 and is also free of ex–post
selection bias. Our findings strongly support the view that, in addition to the risk
aversion, disappointment aversion further leads investors to reduce their
exposure to the stock market (i.e., DA significantly depresses the weights of
equities in all cases considered). We further show that optimal equity proportions
are jointly determined by the levels of risk and disappointment aversion. Taken
together, the findings of this paper enhance our understanding of the sources of
the equity premium puzzle around the world.
Despite its appealing features, being a descriptive model in nature, DA is still
restricted to applications for several reasons. Most importantly, as existing
literature gives little guidance about how to choose an appropriate level of DA, a
quantitative measurement is in demand not only for descriptive purposes, but
also for theoretical development. In an attempt to cover this area, Chapter 3
develops a formal framework to estimate the aggregate level of DA across 35
countries around the world. We propose (i) principal analytic results derived
from the optimization required by DA utility; (ii) the aggregate levels of DA
based on the international asset allocations; and (iii) derived results applied to
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investigate the extent to which the levels of DA are affected by a set of economic
and cultural factors. In particular, our focus is on whether the DA will be
influenced by an individualism index developed by Hofstede (2001).
Our main results stand as follows: first, DA changes depending on different
market conditions. More specifically, for a given period of time, our theoretical
results illustrate that one market (country) offering larger equity premiums is
often surrounded by stronger DA. This is in agreement with the experimental
findings of Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt (2007) in whose study people are
particularly frustrated at suffering losses when they have a very good chance of
winning. Second, DA also changes depending on different asset types. We obtain
a global average DA (standard errors) of stock, bond, and other investments at
2.28 (0.31), 1.64 (0.17) and 1.93 (0.24) respectively. Investors appear to be
more disappointment–averse to a risky asset than a less risky one and this might
be regarded as a potential source of the equity premium puzzle. Third, our
model generates a negative relationship between DA and risk aversion. Implicitly,
it implies that wealthier people are prone to have stronger DA because of their
higher tolerance to risk. Finally, DA is also clearly affected by cultural impacts.
We find robust evidence to conclude that DA is positively associated with
individualism. This may be interpreted as meaning that a more individualistic
character encourages investors to overstate their ability and prior expectations
and therefore leads to a higher probability of being disappointed.
In addition to the dimension of economic concerns, Chapter 4 explores the
dynamic variation of DA in a series of monetary gamble tasks. Our study shows
for the first time that the environmental stimuli could be another means of
altering risk attitude such as risk and disappointment aversion. The variation in
odours elicits statistically significant changes in the degree of DA,
F (1.597, 46.323) = 11.529, p < 0.0005. Compared with clean air, the DA increase
0.141 ± 0.014 for the presence of pleasant odour (jasmine), whilst the difference
jumps further at 0.309 ± 0.074 in response to an unpleasant odour (rotten egg).
Moreover, odour–related individual variations in DA were associated with
hedonic evaluations of odours but not with odour intensity.
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5.2 Further Directions
We identify a few promising avenues for further research. First, Routledge
and Zin (2010) propose a generalized disappointment aversion (GDA)
framework in which outcomes are disappointing only if they lie sufficiently below
the certainty equivalent. This is a more realistic addition to current
decision–making theories that calls for further investigation. Second, the
traditional expected utility accommodates an independence axiom, which means
past performance should be irrelevant to further decisions. One would wonder
whether this contradicts our daily intuitions, as human nature suggests that we
should place limits on the assumption of “no prior effect” and allow for the
possibility that prior outcomes matter for future risky choices. After two famous
survey papers that investigate the aversion to losses over inter–temporal
conditions, Thaler and Johnson (1990) and Gertner (1993) document solid
evidence to argue that most of the decisions under risk are influenced by prior
outcomes. In some later studies, this pattern was even captured among
institutional investors. As O’Connell and Teo (2009) and Froot et al. (2011) find
that, after experiencing losses, professional investors have an increased
propensity to cut risk.
Although the asymmetric utility between gains and losses has experienced
rapid development for years, due to its complexity in dynamics, neither loss
aversion nor disappointment aversion is addressed in response to prior effect.
Therefore, it would be very demanding for subsequent studies to go further
beyond such static settings.
Third, from the view of psychology, decades of studies have found human
perception and evaluation to be inherently comparative (Festinger, 1954;
Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Mussweiler, 2003). Represented by the well–known
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979, 1992), behavioural
decision–making theories have extensively relied on the status quo (SQ) to
identify gain–loss utility. In the meantime, although the SQ appears to be the
most popular evaluative benchmark, recent studies have shown that
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decision–makers are systematically sensitive to multiple reference points. The
assumption related to a single, fixed reference point could potentially impair
prediction power over choice behaviour. Specifically, besides the SQ, scholarly
works (e.g., Heath et al., 1999; Lopes and Oden, 1999; March and Shapira,
1992) emphasise two additional reference points: the goal (G) and the minimum
requirement (MR). The use of G and MR creates two extra domains on the basis
of original gain–loss utility. Since G serves as a desire of aspirations, outcomes
that exceed it are classified as elation (also called success/win in some studies).
The reference point MR represents the requirement of survival, thereby outcomes
below MR are deemed to be a disappointment. Contrary to those early beliefs on
the multiple reference points that assume people combined SQ, G and MR
endogenously (e.g., Olson et al., 1996), subsequent researchers have finalised a
framework by allowing those three reference points to exist and interact
simultaneously (i.e., Koop and Johnson, 2012). For instance, an investor feels
positive towards an outcome that is greater than his SQ. However, he might also
be a little disappointed for not having a better pay–off to meet his G.
Based on the DA utility proposed in Chapter 3, we provide a more detailed
discussion below to show a possible form of multiple reference point. When
investors utilize the multiple reference points, the utility is split into more
regions. Thus, the definition in Eq. (3.1) is no longer suitable to depict how
people code future outcomes. Suppose a situation where investors have two
reference points, denoting the expected wealth level (µw) and the status quo as
the proxy of their goal (G) and minimum requirement (MR), respectively. The
DA utility in Eq. (3.1) can be rewritten as:
µ(W,µw) ≡ µw − ϕ
[
AI−1 |W − µw|v|W≤0
+A′I−2 |W − µw|v|0<W<µw − I−3 |W − µw|v|W≥µw
]
,
(5.1)
where µw is the expected wealth, and W represents the end–of–period wealth.
The parameter, ϕ > 0 shows the relative importance of risk in the utility and
represents the trade–off relationship between the wealth utility and
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disappointment–elation utility. I− is an indicator variable: I−1 equals 1 only if
W ≤ 0; I−2 equals 1 only if 0 < W < µw and I−3 equals to 1 only if W ≥ µw;
otherwise, the indicator variable stays zero. Now, two reference points MR and G
divide the utility into three domains. Specifically, returns that exceed µr (i.e.,
W ≥ G = µw) are processed as elation. They occupy the same region as the
original case of single–reference point. On the contrary, outcomes will be
regarded as disappointment only when they bring absolute losses
(W <= MR = 0). Finally, remaining situations where 0 < µw < G should also
generate bad, but milder feelings, which are controlled by A− and require
1 < A′ < A to hold for all cases. Suppose the curvature parameters v are equal
across all regions: Eq.(5.1) can be rewritten as:
UDA = 1 + rf + α(µr − rf )− ϕ
[
Aαvpdud +A
′αvpmum − αvpeus
]
, (5.2)
where α is the proportion of risky assets, and the expected utility with respect to
each region is given:

ud = E[(W − µw)v|W≤0], pd = Pr(W ≤ 0)
um = E[(W − µw)v|0<W<µw ], pm = Pr(0 < W < µw)
ue = E[(W − µw)v|W≥µw ], pe = Pr(W ≥ µw)
. (5.3)
With respect to the weight (α) on risky assets, taking first-order-condition and
second-order-condition of Eq. (5.2), we have:
∂UDA
∂α
= (µr − rf ) + αv−1ϕv(peue −A′pmum −Apdud) = 0, (5.4)
∂2UDA
∂α2
= αv−2ϕv(v − 1)(peue −A′pmum −Apdud) < 0. (5.5)
Solving Eq. (5.4) and (5.5) simultaneously shows v > 1 again. Hence, extending
to two reference points does not affect Proposition 1 of Chapter 3. In the
meantime, the optimal A∗ can be computed by rearranging Eq. (5.4):
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A∗ =
µ− rf
ϕvpdud
α1−v +
peue −A′pmum
pdud
(5.6)
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This section provides further details of the numerical approximation. The
CRRA maximization problem is
max
α∈[0,1]
EU(µw). (A.1)
The ending period wealth level W is the same in Eq. (2.4). Also, we denote risk
aversion by γ, and U(·) is the power utility of the form U(W ) = W 1−γ1−γ . The FOC
of Eq. (A.1) can be solved by computing α such that
∫ ∞
−∞
W−γ(exp(y)− exp(r))f(y)dy = 0 (A.2)
Where f(y) is the density function of the equity returns, the Gauss–Hermite Rule
is used to get a numerical approximation under the assumption that Eq. (A.2)
converges to a certain value and follows a normal distribution. The
Gauss–Hermite quadrature is an extension of the Gaussian–Quadrature method
for approximating the value of the integrals of the following kind:
∫ ∞
−∞
e−x
2
f(x)dx ≈
n∑
i=1
wif(xi) (A.3)
where xi are the roots of the Hermite polynomial (also called the abscissa points
of risky asset returns in our model), which are given by
Hen(x) = (−1)nex2/2 dndxn e−x
2/2. We take N = 100 of abscissa points to
approximate the integral. The associated weights wi are given by
wi =
2n−1N !
√
pi
N2[HN−1(xi)]2 Choosing quadrature products and weighting functions is
discretionary; we refer to this rule because it can be directly used in dealing with
indefinite integrals without further modification. According to Abramowitz and
Stegun. (1972), for variables that follow normal distributions, Eq. (A.3) is
converted into the formula
∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(y)f(y)dy ≈
n∑
i=1
psϕ(ys) (A.4)
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In our case, ϕ(y) = U(W ) for Eq. (2.2) while ϕ(y) = W−γ(exp(y) − exp(r)) for
Eq. (2.3); f(y) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−
1
2
( y−µ
σ
)2 represents the normal density function of the
equity return with its mean µ and standard deviation σ. ps and ys in Eq. (A.4) are
connected to Eq. (A.3) by
ps =
1√
pi
wi, ys = µ+
√
2σxs (A.5)
In the DA problem, Eq. (2.3) can be rewritten as the following integral when the
µw is known:
∫ µw
−∞
[
W−γ (exp(y)− exp(r))] f(y)dy+A∫ ∞
µw
[
W−γ (exp(y)− exp(r))] f(y)dy = 0
(A.6)
Then the same Gauss–Hermite Rule converts Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) to Eqs.
(2.5) and (2.6), where, like Eq. (A.5), weights and abscissa points are given
by ps = 1√piwi, ys = µ+
√
2σxs
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This section briefly describes the bisection search procedure for finding the
optimal interval of certainty equivalent.
Let xei = exp(y)− exp(r) denote the excess stock returns in any state i out of
N possible outcomes for xe, {xes}Ns=1, with probability weights {ps}Ns=1. We can
sort xe from low to high across all states. The utility equivalent µ∗w corresponding
to the optimal portfolio weight α∗ could be in any of intervals:
[exp(r) + α∗xe,1, exp(r) + α∗xe,2]
[exp(r) + α∗xe,2, exp(r) + α∗xe,3]
...
[exp(r) + α∗xe,N−1, exp(r) + α∗xe,N ]
Suppose µ∗w lies in state i, namely, at a interval [exp(r) + α∗e,i, exp(r) + α
∗
e,i+1].
Then α∗ solves:
∑
s:Ws≤exp(r)+α∗xe,i
ps(W
∗
s )
−γxes +A
∑
s:Ws>exp(r)+α∗xe,i
ps(W
∗
s )
−γxes = 0, (B.1)
where W ∗s = exp(r) + α∗xes. According to Ang et al. (2005), Eq. (B.1) is a CRRA
maximization problem with a modified probability distribution pii = {piis}Ns=1, i.e.,
the probabilities piis are transformed from the original quadrature probabilities ps
by the relation
pii ≡ (p1, ..., pi, Api+1, ...ApN )
′
(p1 + ...+ pi) +A(pi+1 + ...pN )
. (B.2)
The certainty equivalent µ∗w can be referred as
µ∗w =
(
N∑
s=1
(W ∗s )
1−γpiis
)1/(1−γ)
. (B.3)
The algorithm of the bisection search is as follows:
Step.1 Beginning with a guess state i, sloving α∗i
Setp.2 Computing the µ∗wi by Eq.(B.3)
Setp.3 Checking if in this state the following is true:
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µwi ⊂ [exp(r) + α∗xe,i, exp(r) + α∗xe,i+1]
if this is true for i = i∗, then α∗ = α∗i and µ
∗
w = µ
∗
wi . Since the states are ordered
in increasing wealth across states for a given portfolio weight, if Step.3 is not
satisfied and we find that µwi is greater (smaller) than exp(r) + α∗xe,i+1, then we
go back to Step.1 by searching in the upper (lower) half of the state space.
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